M11: what the server will actually read

The release-validation milestone, and the thing it had to settle first was
whether any of the earlier evidence meant what it said. M8 measured a deployment
enforcing a 4,096-token input window while the application budgeted 16,384.
Every request returned 200. What Ollama does with the excess is drop the oldest
tokens, and the oldest tokens here are the system block — the narrator's rules
and the campaign canon. A hundred-turn certification against that server would
have looked perfect and proved nothing, which is why this milestone could not
begin with a hundred turns.

So the application asks now. Ollama's window is a property of how a model was
loaded rather than of the request — sending num_ctx is accepted, ignored, and
worse, reloads the model at the server's own default — so the only honest move
is to find out and then tell the truth about it. /api/ps reports what a resident
model is being served with, /api/show what an unloaded one will load with, both
on the same host inference already uses, through the same endpoint policy and
the same TLS trust store. A verified window is a ceiling on the budget; an
unverified one leaves the budget alone and is recorded as unverified in the
turn's own provenance, so an old turn can be asked afterwards whether it was
built against a checked window. There is no third behaviour, and in particular
no hard-coded 4,096: a number the server did not say would be right on one
machine and wrong on the next.

The proof that this is doing something is a campaign whose canon sits at the
front of the prompt, 120 turns of history, and a 4,096-token window. The canon
is still there afterwards and the oldest history is gone. The same campaign
built the old way produces a prompt more than twice the window — the defect,
reproduced, so the fix is measured against it rather than asserted.

Two defects the validation found on its own, and they are the same defect twice:
something was true and nobody was told. A manual state correction of four
changes with one bad reference applied three, returned 201, and said nothing —
while recording the refusal on the audit row nobody reads. It came to light
because the identity diagnostic's own fixture was refused that way and the whole
run proceeded on a campaign with no scene, which would have read as a model
failure. And the narration-length setting moved no number: brief, medium and
long each became one English sentence, while the numeric hint the model actually
reads was derived from the global reply cap and said the same thing for all
three. Both now say what they did.

The other two post-M8 findings are closed as well. The tab said AI D&D, which no
document had ever claimed it did not; it says Interactive Story now, with the
open campaign first, and the name is the owner's decision rather than a
find-and-replace to something narrower than the engine. After an Undo the reader
could not tell where they had landed; the control row now ends with
"Moment 11 · later story ahead", from the server's own answer, in the word the
transcript already uses, with none of head, branch or depth anywhere near it.

The identity diagnostic exists and the root cause does not. That campaign was
destroyed, so no cause can be established — what M11 owes the finding is
something that can classify the next occurrence, and a diagnostic that makes only
the judgements a program can honestly make: duplicate keys, shared names,
protagonist drift, state and context disagreeing. Whether prose misattributed a
line is left to a person reading it beside its prompt, because a regex cannot
read dialogue and one that pretended to would produce exactly the confident wrong
answer this finding is about. Its detectors are proved to fire against a planted
second Alice.

Two entities may still share a display name. That was checked first, as the
finding asked, and left permitted: a mother and a daughter, or a stranger giving
a false name, are ordinary fiction, and refusing them to guard against a model
mistake would refuse the wrong thing. What was missing was that it happened
silently. It is reported now.

Evidence, not inference: a hundred accepted turns against a real narrator with
genuine process restarts; a real browser against the built SPA; a container with
no network at all; a campaign moved into a data directory that never existed.
Each was discarded and re-run whenever the product changed under it, and the runs
that were thrown away are listed in the report with the reason, along with ten
defects in the harnesses themselves — because a harness that has only ever
agreed with itself is not evidence, and two of M8's five harness defects were
masking real ones.

No dependency was added, removed or upgraded. No acceptance test was retired,
relaxed or reclassified. M11 is implemented and verified; it is not accepted, and
there is no release tag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Qyn3oRd4D6pi72nKBG725B
This commit is contained in:
JesseMarkowitz
2026-09-07 14:01:20 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 1013c94eb1
commit 144406cd48
57 changed files with 7374 additions and 97 deletions
+42 -2
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,48 @@
# Planning Package Version
- **Package:** Adventure Storyteller Planning Package v3.6
- **Package:** Adventure Storyteller Planning Package v3.7
- **Revision date:** 2026-09-07
- **Status:** Phase 0 complete; architecture selected; **Milestones M1-M8 implemented and accepted**; **M9 and M10 implemented and awaiting independent review** (2026-09-07). M11 has not been started.
- **Status:** Phase 0 complete; architecture selected; **Milestones M1-M8 implemented and accepted**; **M9 and M10 implemented, M10 committed and signed**; **M11 implemented and verified, awaiting independent review/acceptance** (2026-09-07). M11 is the last planned milestone before v1 acceptance.
## v3.7 — M11 implemented: v1 security, long-run and release validation (2026-09-07)
The release-validation milestone. Most of what it changed is evidence rather
than product; the product changes it did make were each forced by something the
validation found.
| Document | Change | Kind |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `TECHNICAL-DESIGN.md` | **New §15.2** — the inference window as a ceiling: how it is discovered, where it is enforced, and why there is no hard-coded 4,096. | as-implemented record |
| `DATA-MODEL.md` | **New §28B** — M11's one column (`narration_length`), and why the window ceiling, `duplicate_names` and `refused` are all deliberately *not* stored. | as-implemented record |
| `BROWSER-UX-SPEC.md` | **§8A gains an implementation note** — the position indicator that answers it, and the three properties that make it answer it. | as-implemented record |
| `SECURITY-THREAT-MODEL.md` | **New §42B** — the probe held to §73, the silent partial correction closed as a §69 gap, H09 recorded as not applicable with a test to keep it honest, and the measured contrast. | boundary + measurement notes |
| `V1-ACCEPTANCE-TESTS.md` | Results for the M11 release run against every REQUIRED test. | acceptance evidence |
| `BUILD-MILESTONES.md` | **M11 status block**, and the disposition of the four post-M8 playtest findings it owned. | milestone status |
| `README.md`, `DEVELOPMENT.md` | The context-window behaviour, `contextwindow.py` in the architecture map, and how to re-run the six release harnesses. | developer docs |
| `reports/M11-IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md` | New. The evidence package for independent release review. | milestone report |
| `reports/M10-IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md` | Moved to `archive/milestone-reports/`. | report rotation |
**The release blocker M11 was given, and what it cost.** M8 measured a
deployment enforcing 4,096 tokens while the application budgeted 16,384, with
every request returning 200 and `llama.cpp` silently dropping the oldest tokens —
which here are the narrator's rules and the campaign canon. M11 makes the
application ask the server what it will accept and cap itself to that, or say
that it could not check. Not a hard-coded number, not a cloud probe, not a
guess from the model's name: `/api/ps` for a loaded model, `/api/show` for one
that is not, under the same endpoint policy and TLS trust as inference.
**Two product defects found by the validation itself**, both of the same
family — something true that nobody was told:
- a **manual state correction that was partly refused** returned an unqualified
success. Found because the identity diagnostic's own fixture was refused that
way and the run proceeded silently on a degraded campaign;
- the **narration-length setting moved no number** (post-M8 finding C), so the
numeric hint the model reads said the same thing for brief, medium and long.
**Zero requirement weakenings.** No acceptance test was retired, relaxed or
reclassified. H09 is reported NOT APPLICABLE on the condition its own text
states, and that condition is now enforced by a test.
## v3.6 — M10 implemented: future media extension hooks only (2026-09-07)