Apply post-M1 corrections to the planning package
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# Planning Package Version
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**Package:** Adventure Storyteller Planning Package v2
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**Revision date:** 2026-09-01
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**Status:** Phase 0 complete; architecture selected; production milestone plan approved for milestone-by-milestone implementation.
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**Package:** Adventure Storyteller Planning Package v2.1
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**Revision date:** 2026-09-02
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**Status:** Phase 0 complete; architecture selected; **Milestone M1 implemented and accepted**; M2 not yet briefed.
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## v2.1 — Post-M1 Corrections (2026-09-02)
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M1 implementation evidence contradicted or under-specified parts of v2. The
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corrections are recorded in the documents themselves and listed in
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`README.md` § *Post-M1 corrections applied*; the evidence behind them is in
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`reports/M1-BASELINE-REPORT.md` and `reports/M1-IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md`.
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In summary:
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- a trusted-LAN Ollama may be **HTTPS with a privately issued certificate**;
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clients verify against the operating system's CA store, with full certificate
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and hostname verification and no bypass option (ADR 002,
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`TECHNICAL-DESIGN.md` §5, A06),
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- offline claims require a **fresh cache and no route out** to be evidence at
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all, and vendored runtime artifacts should be integrity-verifiable
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(ADR 004),
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- A05's invariant is about **accepted** history; the user's submitted text is
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deliberately retained on a failed turn,
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- A06 requires a **real second machine and an HTTPS endpoint**; a plain-HTTP
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LAN test is no longer sufficient evidence,
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- the standard test environment records **CPU/GPU/RAM**, because cold model
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load on a CPU-only host exceeded the inherited 120 s client timeout,
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- `BUILD-MILESTONES.md` records M1 as complete and reframes M2's endpoint work
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as **narrowing** an existing capability rather than inventing it,
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- `SECURITY-THREAT-MODEL.md` §53 distinguishes **inbound** TLS (still deferred)
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from **outbound** certificate verification (required, done in M1).
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Nothing in the architecture selected in v2 was reversed.
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## v2 — Post Phase 0B Revision (2026-09-01)
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This v2 package supersedes the earlier planning package produced before the final Phase 0B review and the trusted-LAN Ollama deployment clarification.
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