Harden auth against a forwarded-header rate-limit bypass, and guard BYOK SSRF
The per-IP rate limits could be bypassed entirely: uvicorn ran with --forwarded-allow-ips "*", which trusts the leftmost X-Forwarded-For value (client-controlled), and Render forwards the inbound header rather than stripping it. Rotating the header handed out a fresh rate-limit bucket per request, so the login/register limit (10/5min) and guest-minting limit (30/5min) were no throttle at all — unbounded password guessing and guest-row creation. Confirmed live: fixed IP -> 429 after 10; rotating spoofed header -> no 429 across 14 attempts. Two-layer fix: - limits._client_ip now derives the client IP from the hop the trusted edge appends (rightmost of X-Forwarded-For), which a client can't spoof past; tunable via AIDND_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. Dropped --forwarded-allow-ips "*". - New per-account login throttle (email-keyed, 8 fails / 15 min, cleared on success): stops distributed guessing against one account that a per-IP limit can't, since it can't be diluted across many source addresses. Also close an SSRF on the BYOK endpoint_url (hosted mode only): the connection test and turn/chat streams now refuse a URL that resolves to a non-public address (private/loopback/link-local metadata/reserved), checked at request time so it resists a DNS record flipping to a private IP. No-op locally, where reaching localhost Ollama is intended. Tests: test_ratelimit_hardening.py (8), test_netguard.py (13). 172 pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015CYEJKobJ2Re4Dv7qUoSA7
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co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
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c500203270
@@ -105,13 +105,18 @@ def login(
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raise HTTPException(400, "Accounts are disabled in local mode.")
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limits.rate_limit("auth", request)
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email = payload.email.strip().lower()
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# Per-account throttle: stops distributed guessing against one email even
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# when the per-IP limit above is diluted across many source addresses.
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limits.check_login_allowed(email)
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user = db.query(models.User).filter(models.User.email == email).first()
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if (
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user is None
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or not user.password_hash
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or not security.verify_password(payload.password, user.password_hash)
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):
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limits.note_login_failure(email)
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raise HTTPException(401, "Incorrect email or password.")
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limits.note_login_success(email)
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_set_session_cookie(response, user.id)
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return me_payload(user, db)
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