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5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 JesseMarkowitz
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8c65ae99de |
M2: cut the hosted product away from the local one
94 files, +1,395 -6,578. Three files are new; twenty-four are gone. The milestone is subtraction, and what is left is the single-user local storyteller the specification describes. Removed in full: campaign scripting and its QuickJS sandbox; multi-user accounts, guest sessions, login, registration and the shared demo key; the visitor-analytics tables, dashboard and page beacon; the access log of sign-ins, addresses and devices; per-IP and per-user rate limiting and quotas; Render deployment config; Postgres and psycopg; cloud inference providers, the API-key field and the key encryption that existed to store it; session-cookie signing. None of it was hidden behind a flag — the routes are gone and answer 404. Two things were kept that the brief allowed keeping. The `users` table and its foreign keys stay as an internal ownership detail, because rewriting them out means a migration across most of the schema to delete a column that costs nothing; nothing creates a second user and no request carries an identity. Five inert tables and four inert columns stay for the same reason, so an M1 campaign database opens unchanged. The one addition is app/endpoints.py, which decides where a story may be sent. Loopback, RFC1918, link-local, unique-local and CGNAT — an explicit allowlist of networks, not a guess at what `ipaddress` means by "private", which calls the documentation ranges private and IPv6 loopback reserved. Every address a hostname resolves to must be in it, so a split answer does not squeak through, and the rule runs both when the endpoint is saved and before every outbound request, because a name that resolved to the LAN this morning can resolve elsewhere this afternoon. Known cloud hosts are named in the refusal so the error says why rather than looking like broken DNS. TLS is never traded against it: M1's shared trust context is intact on all four clients and there is no way to skip verification. The hardcoded 120-second model timeout is now a setting. That was not theoretical — on this GPU-less four-core host a cold load of qwen2.5:3b-instruct took 648.9 seconds to produce the first turn, while turns 2 to 5 of the same campaign took 3.6 to 13.1. Connect stays short at 10s so a wrong address still fails fast; the read timeout defaults to 300s and is bounded at 3600, because "wait longer" must stay a number. Two defects found while testing and fixed here. An unknown /api path fell through the SPA catch-all and came back as HTML with status 200, so a client asking for JSON parsed a web page instead of learning the route was gone. And AIDND_CORS_ORIGINS accepted "*", which on an unauthenticated loopback API would hand every page on the Internet a write handle on the campaign database; it now refuses to start. Verified rather than assumed. Offline, on a network with no route out and no DNS: five turns, retry with both takes retained, restart with an identical transcript digest, a failed model call leaving the accepted AI-turn count untouched, and a capture with zero non-loopback unicast packets. Against a real second machine on the LAN over HTTPS with a private CA: four turns, restart, and a capture showing 289 packets to the approved host, 344 loopback, zero anywhere else, zero DNS queries. Cloud and public endpoints refused with their reasons; no API key settable; every removed route 404. 604 backend tests pass, down from 648 by the fifteen retired with the subsystems they tested and up by the twenty-nine added for the endpoint policy and the removed surface. The scripting tests were not deleted: eight files used a JavaScript counter as instrumentation for the state snapshot and rollback machinery, which M2 does not touch, so the counter moved to the world-state engine and those tests still assert what they always did. Frontend lint and build are clean; the image builds, and its wheel-building stage is gone with quickjs. No M3 work. Undo is still destructive and there is still no Redo. |
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Claude
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745a4ea9f3 |
Stop printing the database password
The report opened with the connection string it was about to work on, taken straight from AIDND_DATABASE_URL. On the hosted deploy that string carries the Neon password, so the first line of every run put a live credential into the console — and from there into scrollback, a screenshot, or a pasted bug report. Nothing in the output said it was there to notice. It now prints scheme, user, host and database name. The query string goes whole: sslmode is the only part worth reading, and some drivers accept a password there as well. 631 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tqgupw5CZGjSZrUTNUd4fW |
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Claude
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eeab8ef5bb |
Survive the console this will actually be run from
The report prints an arrow between the old and new word counts, and it prints the memories themselves, which are model-written prose. A Windows console defaults to cp1252 and cannot encode either, so the run dies on UnicodeEncodeError partway through — after some memories have been rewritten and committed, which is the worst place to stop. STATUS already carries the same warning for tools/dbmeter.py. stdout is reconfigured to UTF-8 with errors="replace" instead, so the report degrades a character at a time rather than failing. The usage notes were also written for a POSIX shell, and this project is developed in PowerShell, where `VAR=x command` is not a thing. Both docs now give the PowerShell form first, via Read-Host so the Neon URL and the secret stay out of the history file, and name the venv's Python. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tqgupw5CZGjSZrUTNUd4fW |
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Claude
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4c94dd0fc0 |
Keep a production run to the adventures you meant
The hosted database is not the local one. It holds other people's stories, and `summary_provider` builds from the adventure owner's Settings, so an unfiltered `--write` against it would spend other people's money rewriting memories they never asked about. `--adventure` could already hold a run down, but only if you knew the ids. `--email` names accounts instead, and every line of the report now says who owns the adventure, so a dry run answers "whose keys would this spend" before anything is written. Guests have no email and stay reachable only by id, which is the right amount of friction for touching a stranger's bank. The other half is written down rather than built: stored API keys are encrypted with AIDND_SECRET_KEY, so a run from a checkout against the Neon database needs the same value the web service holds. With a different one `decrypt_secret` returns "" instead of failing, and every adventure is reported as having no key — a run that looks like it worked and did nothing. The Dockerfile copies backend/app alone, so tools/ is not on the box either way; the recipe is a checkout pointed at AIDND_DATABASE_URL. 629 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tqgupw5CZGjSZrUTNUd4fW |
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Claude
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0633cb624e |
Run the new memory prompt back over an old bank
The prompt change only reaches memories written after it. plan/18 decided to leave the existing ones alone and let eviction age them out at memory_bank_capacity, on the grounds that re-summarizing would duplicate whatever was still in the bank because nothing deletes the old rows. That was wrong about the only option. A memory can be rewritten in place. The row carries more than its text — whether it is pinned, how often it has been retrieved, and the node it hangs off, which is what makes a fork inherit the right memories — and rewriting `text` keeps all of it. Deleting the bank and rewinding the cursor would lose that, and would trickle memories back at MAX_MEMORIES_PER_RUN per turn, so an adventure nobody is playing would never recover. tools/rewrite_memories.py does it. Without --write it makes no model calls and only reports the scope; --write rewrites, --embed re-embeds in the run rather than leaving it to the app's post-turn pass. It reads whichever database the app reads, so it works against the hosted Postgres as well as a local file. Two things it needed from the app. `summarize_block` is now the one place a memory prompt is assembled, and the post-turn pass calls it too — a backfill that built its own prompt would be writing memories with a prompt that never shipped, and nothing would report the drift. `source_block` reads a memory's block back out of the story, which nothing has ever had to do: it reads on the lineage of the branch the memory was written on, not the branch being played, because after a fork the same depths hold different actions on each side and a read through the adventure's path would summarize the wrong story silently. It also excludes the discarded attempts at a retried turn, and tolerates a block an action has since been deleted from. Left alone: a memory with no source range, which is hand-written or migrated by 62 and may be the player's own words; a memory whose actions are gone; and an adventure whose owner has no API key, because summarization spends the user's own key by construction and never the shared demo key. --api-key/--model/ --endpoint override that, the last of them aiming a run at claude_shim.py. The vector is cleared for every rewrite, because the stored one describes wording that no longer exists. Re-embedding always uses the owner's own embedding model, never --endpoint: a vector only means anything against the vectors it is ranked beside. 17 tests, 627 green. The fork case is the one that would fail quietly, so the test builds a fork whose depths hold different actions on each side. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tqgupw5CZGjSZrUTNUd4fW |