144406cd481df567c4d96131002d907785045e9e
9
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 JesseMarkowitz
|
8c65ae99de |
M2: cut the hosted product away from the local one
94 files, +1,395 -6,578. Three files are new; twenty-four are gone. The milestone is subtraction, and what is left is the single-user local storyteller the specification describes. Removed in full: campaign scripting and its QuickJS sandbox; multi-user accounts, guest sessions, login, registration and the shared demo key; the visitor-analytics tables, dashboard and page beacon; the access log of sign-ins, addresses and devices; per-IP and per-user rate limiting and quotas; Render deployment config; Postgres and psycopg; cloud inference providers, the API-key field and the key encryption that existed to store it; session-cookie signing. None of it was hidden behind a flag — the routes are gone and answer 404. Two things were kept that the brief allowed keeping. The `users` table and its foreign keys stay as an internal ownership detail, because rewriting them out means a migration across most of the schema to delete a column that costs nothing; nothing creates a second user and no request carries an identity. Five inert tables and four inert columns stay for the same reason, so an M1 campaign database opens unchanged. The one addition is app/endpoints.py, which decides where a story may be sent. Loopback, RFC1918, link-local, unique-local and CGNAT — an explicit allowlist of networks, not a guess at what `ipaddress` means by "private", which calls the documentation ranges private and IPv6 loopback reserved. Every address a hostname resolves to must be in it, so a split answer does not squeak through, and the rule runs both when the endpoint is saved and before every outbound request, because a name that resolved to the LAN this morning can resolve elsewhere this afternoon. Known cloud hosts are named in the refusal so the error says why rather than looking like broken DNS. TLS is never traded against it: M1's shared trust context is intact on all four clients and there is no way to skip verification. The hardcoded 120-second model timeout is now a setting. That was not theoretical — on this GPU-less four-core host a cold load of qwen2.5:3b-instruct took 648.9 seconds to produce the first turn, while turns 2 to 5 of the same campaign took 3.6 to 13.1. Connect stays short at 10s so a wrong address still fails fast; the read timeout defaults to 300s and is bounded at 3600, because "wait longer" must stay a number. Two defects found while testing and fixed here. An unknown /api path fell through the SPA catch-all and came back as HTML with status 200, so a client asking for JSON parsed a web page instead of learning the route was gone. And AIDND_CORS_ORIGINS accepted "*", which on an unauthenticated loopback API would hand every page on the Internet a write handle on the campaign database; it now refuses to start. Verified rather than assumed. Offline, on a network with no route out and no DNS: five turns, retry with both takes retained, restart with an identical transcript digest, a failed model call leaving the accepted AI-turn count untouched, and a capture with zero non-loopback unicast packets. Against a real second machine on the LAN over HTTPS with a private CA: four turns, restart, and a capture showing 289 packets to the approved host, 344 loopback, zero anywhere else, zero DNS queries. Cloud and public endpoints refused with their reasons; no API key settable; every removed route 404. 604 backend tests pass, down from 648 by the fifteen retired with the subsystems they tested and up by the twenty-nine added for the endpoint policy and the removed surface. The scripting tests were not deleted: eight files used a JavaScript counter as instrumentation for the state snapshot and rollback machinery, which M2 does not touch, so the counter moved to the world-state engine and those tests still assert what they always did. Frontend lint and build are clean; the image builds, and its wheel-building stage is gone with quickjs. No M3 work. Undo is still destructive and there is still no Redo. |
||
|
parththakkar106andClaude Opus 5
|
b1772c6e21 |
Plan the readability refactor, and clear the tree for it
Phase 17 splits the four files that hold most of the code, finishes the schema migration SP8 left half done, and stops the published guide from drifting away from its Markdown source. `plan/17-refactor.md` carries the plan and the progress table, and `plan/STATUS.md` points at it. Stage 0 is hygiene only. Both abandoned worktrees are gone, which freed about 104 MB. Removing `sp7-tree-ui` needed one extra step: a Vite dev server had been running out of it since 2026-08-18, holding `frontend/.vite` open and owning port 5173, and serving a tree 54 commits behind `main`. The three stale `.db` files are deleted; `data.db` is not. `AIDND_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS` is now documented. It was read at `limits.py:55` and named in no `.env.example`, README, or blueprint. It sets how many proxy hops the rate limiter trusts in `X-Forwarded-For`, so a deployment that adds a hop without setting it gets the bucket-rotation bypass back. The 19 squash-landed branches are still there. `git branch -D` is blocked by the permission classifier; the verified command is in the plan file. 549 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014Dix4oGV3njgWRdu7P9t6r |
||
|
parththakkar106andClaude Opus 5
|
041f9e25f3 |
Count the visits, and say whether anyone got anywhere
A hosted demo raises a question a local app never does: is anyone using it, and do they reach the part that matters? `/analytics` answers it — visitors, pages, referrers, countries, devices, which shared scenarios get played, turns and demo-key spend, API and turn errors, and a funnel from visited to played a turn to signed up. Not a third-party script, for reasons specific to this one. The CSP allows `script-src 'self'`, so a tracker means loosening it; adblockers eat the popular ones, which silently biases exactly the technical audience this project gets shown to; and none of them can see the measurement that actually matters here, which is a turn, not a pageview. **A visit is a write and never a read.** After the 189x egress fix it would be perverse to add a feature that reads rows per request, so counts accumulate in a process-local dict and flush every 60s as UPSERTs. Storage is a generic `(day, metric, label) -> hits` counter, so measuring something new later costs a constant rather than a migration, plus one row per visitor per day for the funnel flags. Every dashboard query is a GROUP BY returning tens of rows however much traffic sits behind it; a month reads back in a few kilobytes. The buffer's cost is that a hard restart can lose up to a minute — the flusher also runs on shutdown, and a tier that sleeps when idle sleeps on an empty buffer anyway. **The counters are anonymous; the access log beside them is not, on purpose.** A visitor is `HMAC(secret, "visitor:<user id>")` truncated to 32 chars — one-way, so `analytics_daily` and `analytics_visitor_days` cannot be joined back to `users`, and keyed, so no client can compute one. Story content never reaches that module, and the only content it ever names is a seeded public scenario's title; a player's own titles are theirs. `accesslog.py` is the identifying half and is a separate module writing a separate table so that separation is a property of the code rather than a convention: `access_events` records sessions, sign-ins, registrations and failed attempts with address, email and device, read on a second tab of the same page behind the same gate. Both halves are gated on `AIDND_ANALYTICS_EMAILS`, not `POWER_USERS`. An unmetered tester is not automatically someone who should see the traffic. The route 404s and the nav link is absent for everyone else, the same treatment AI Chat gets; unset in a hosted deploy means nobody sees it, including me. Three things came out of building it that a test would not have suggested. **A failed turn is an HTTP 200 with a bad ending.** The status-code middleware cannot see one, so a demo whose model had started refusing every request would look perfectly healthy from outside. All five SSE error paths in `_generate_turn` now go through a `turn_error()` helper that counts on the way out. Error buckets elsewhere are labelled by the matched route template rather than the requested path — one bucket per endpoint instead of one per adventure id, and, the reason it isn't merely tidier, an unmatched path is entirely attacker-chosen, so labelling by it would let anyone mint rows. **The funnel counts people, not clicks.** A player who starts six adventures is one person who started an adventure. That is the whole reason the per-visitor-day table exists; its flags only ever turn on, and `is_new` is settled by the first write of a visitor's first day. **The tests run on SQLite and production is Neon.** A flush that raises is caught and logged, so a dialect mistake in the UPSERTs would have stayed invisible until the dashboard quietly never filled. `test_the_upserts_compile_for_postgres` compiles both statements against the Postgres dialect without connecting to one. Two things this leans on elsewhere. `limits._client_ip` is now public `client_ip`: the access log needs the same answer, and two functions both deciding which hop is the caller's is how one of them ends up trusting a header it shouldn't. And the cleanup sweeper now starts if *either* job has work — a deployment can keep every guest forever and still want its visitor-day rows aged out. No migration. Both tables are new and `bootstrap()` calls `create_all` on existing databases too, the route `branches` took in Phase 14, so `LATEST_VERSION` is still 64. 497 tests green, frontend lint and build clean, driven by hand against a synthetic 90-day fixture at 1568px. The narrow-screen layout follows the existing 720px block but is unverified: `resize_window` is ignored on a maximized Chrome and `frame-ancestors 'none'` rules out checking it in a sized iframe. Also repaired here: a rename in test_ratelimit_hardening.py had run through the test names themselves, leaving `testclient_ip_*` — still collected by pytest, which is why it passed unnoticed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DfMCsN1KBLsTqMkj5hSgrY |
||
|
parththakkar106andClaude Opus 5
|
bbcb07c6be |
Delete guest accounts left idle for five days
The app had no cleanup of any kind: in multi-user mode every first visit mints a users row, so the demo has been accumulating one permanent account per visitor along with everything they generated. cleanup.py sweeps guests idle for AIDND_GUEST_RETENTION_DAYS (default 5), once at startup and then every few hours. Startup is the load-bearing trigger — the free tier sleeps after ~15 minutes, so a long timer rarely gets to fire. Idle is COALESCE(last_seen_at, created_at), not last_seen_at: _touch only writes that column hourly, and a guest minted by /auth/me has it NULL until its second request, so the simpler query would have deleted brand-new visitors mid-session. It's one Core DELETE rather than db.delete(user), which would SELECT every adventure, action and memory into Python purely to delete them — the same egress pattern as the 189x fix. Every FK from users down is ON DELETE CASCADE, so the database does the whole graph and returns a count. The filter requires is_guest AND email IS NULL, so registered users (who upgrade in place) and local mode's implicit user are both out of reach, and is_public is output-only so a guest can never own content another user can see. Session cookies have no expiry and can outlive a swept row; that path 401s and the frontend's existing retry re-mints a session. Guests are told: /auth/me serves guest_retention_days and the signup modal states the window, sourced from the server so it can't drift from what is enforced. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015CYEJKobJ2Re4Dv7qUoSA7 |
||
|
parththakkar106andClaude Opus 5
|
1dd31086c1 |
Add power-user AI Chat page; centralize demo-key model pinning
AI Chat is a plain scratchpad for talking to a model directly — no story context, scripts or world state — for poking at models, prompts and endpoints without starting an adventure. Power users only: the router 404s (rather than 403s) for everyone else and the nav link is hidden. The conversation lives in localStorage, so there's no new table or migration. is_power_user() now also returns True in local mode: it's the operator's own machine and their own key, the same reasoning that makes the provider debug log local-only. Alongside that, the rule keeping the shared demo key off paid models now lives in exactly one place. It had been duplicated into the chat router, which is how one copy eventually drifts: - resolve_provider_config() takes an optional model_override and is the only place the whitelist is applied, so turns, AI Chat and the connection test all inherit it. An override is a per-request preference, never a grant. - ProviderConfig.__post_init__ refuses to exist when api_key is the demo key and the model isn't whitelisted. It keys on the key itself rather than the using_demo flag, so a mislabelled config can't slip past, and it raises so a future path that bypasses the resolver fails loudly instead of billing. - The demo branch still pins endpoint_url too — a user-controlled endpoint would leak the key itself, which is worse than spending it. Provider gained chat(messages, ...) beside generate(), both delegating to a shared _stream(url, body); completion-mode endpoints get the messages flattened into a labelled transcript. Settings' /models fetch moved to list_endpoint_models() and is shared with /api/chat/config. Tests: 10 new in tests/test_chat.py (70 total). These deliberately do not stub resolve_provider_config — the point is to exercise the real BYOK-vs-demo decision and assert on what the provider actually received: off-whitelist override pinned, off-whitelist Settings.model pinned, redirected endpoint pinned, BYOK passed through untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FGY1yvzSeKgTtRfeVtDmx |
||
|
parththakkar106andClaude Opus 4.8
|
94db6e055b |
Add power-user email allowlist to bypass demo turn cap
Trusted testers listed in AIDND_POWER_USERS get unmetered turns on the shared demo key: demo_turns_left reports the full cap and count_demo_turn skips them. Registered accounts only, matched case-insensitively. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TEpWMjnfPqzZ13nPMoGhs5 |
||
|
parththakkar106andClaude Opus 4.8
|
4772171b6c |
Phase 9: production hardening
Config via env, abuse/resource limits, and production serving so the app is safe to expose publicly: - Fail-fast on missing SECRET_KEY when MULTI_USER=true - quickjs per-execution time/memory limits (while(true) can't hang server) - Per-user/per-IP rate limiting on turn/script/auth endpoints - Request body size limit + per-user row caps - Security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options, nosniff, referrer-policy) incl. SSE - Debug router 403 and /docs disabled in multi-user mode - DATABASE_URL support (defaults to Neon Postgres) alongside SQLite - Documented all env vars in backend/.env.example Verified locally via uvicorn (MULTI_USER=1, SQLite); see plan/09-phase-hardening.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017e6tQuojBLYPetUfmhit4X |
||
|
parththakkar106andClaude Fable 5
|
de4db373f2 |
Phase 8: optional accounts, per-user data, shared demo key
Guest-first multi-user mode behind AIDND_MULTI_USER (local installs unchanged): signed-cookie guest sessions bootstrapped by /api/auth/me, register upgrades the guest in place, login/logout, per-IP rate limits. Every router scoped by user_id; Settings become per-user with the API key Fernet-encrypted at rest and write-only through the API. Users without a key get a server-funded demo key (OpenRouter free models, 20 turns/day, memory bank disabled on demo turns). Public read-only demo scenarios (seed_demo.py); debug log restricted to local mode. Frontend: auth modal + guest nudge, 401 re-establish/retry, demo banner and key management in Settings. Migrations 13-23 adopt existing data under a local user and encrypt stored keys. Verified: migration on a copy of real data.db, two-session isolation + register/login via curl and Chrome, demo cap 429, live OpenRouter turn through the encrypted-key path, vite build + oxlint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KFsGHju9szibJJa2YJcdbg |
||
|
parththakkar106andClaude Fable 5
|
22630c8411 |
Phase 7: MIT license, portfolio README, Docker, cross-platform start
- LICENSE: MIT - README: rewritten as portfolio-grade docs (features with code pointers, architecture, Docker/Windows/macOS quick starts, BYO-model table) - Dockerfile (3-stage: SPA build, pip wheels, slim runtime) + compose with a /data volume; .dockerignore keeps secrets and local data out - database.py: AIDND_DB_PATH env override so deployments can relocate the SQLite file; documented in backend/.env.example - start.sh: macOS/Linux dev script with first-run setup Verified locally: production SPA build served by the backend (deep links OK), DB created at the override path. Docker image itself untested here (Docker not installed); flagged in plan/07. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KFsGHju9szibJJa2YJcdbg |