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Commits
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 JesseMarkowitzandClaude Opus 5
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2fdd2547f0 |
Planning: record M2 closeout decisions
M2's review reported six planning recommendations rather than applying them, three marked before M3. All six are applied here, plus three additions drawn from the same evidence. No implementation file is touched. The endpoint policy was the gap that mattered. It is the most consequential setting in the application — the storyteller sends the player's prose, the context, the memories and the embedding inputs to whatever address it names — and it existed only as a module docstring. It is now ADR 011 and a new §10A in the threat model, which also retires the assumption in §71A that the inherited guard was a starting point. It was not: AI-DnD's SSRF guard blocked private addresses to stop a hosted server reaching its own internal network, which is the exact opposite of what a local storyteller needs. It was removed, not adapted. Both documents state the rule as implemented — an allowlist of explicit local-network CIDRs, every resolved address checked, enforced on save and again before every outbound request, TLS never traded against it — and both state the two residual limits plainly rather than implying they are covered: a hostile host already on the trusted LAN is inside the permitted boundary, and a rebinding interval exists between the policy's resolution and the client's connection. Accepted risks, not M3 work. The CIDRs are spelled out rather than derived from is_private/is_reserved, and the ADR records why: is_private is true of the documentation ranges and 0.0.0.0/8, and is_reserved is true of IPv6 loopback, so a rule built on it refuses an ordinary same-host Ollama on [::1]. TECHNICAL-DESIGN §5.1 items 3 and 4 are marked done, closing all five hardening items. A new §5.2 records the M1/M2 architecture as fact rather than intention, so later milestones inherit what the code does. A new §18.1 carries the lesson of M2's two regressions: when removing a setting, test a real consumer construction path; when adding one, prove it reaches the component that uses it. Both defects hid behind a green suite because the tests at that boundary were mocks. BUILD-MILESTONES records M2 complete, with the capabilities later milestones inherit and the debt carried forward. Two notes go to milestones that would otherwise misread what M2 left them. M5 is told that eight rollback tests now use the world-state engine as instrumentation and not as endorsement — the instrumentation moves when the protocol does, and those tests are reworked rather than deleted. M6 is told that the memory bank died silently under a green suite, so background failure must be observable and at least one real provider-construction path must be tested. The security contract gains what M2 demonstrated. H10 now names the two conditions that were defects during M2: a wildcard origin must be refused at startup, and an unknown /api path must 404 rather than returning the SPA with 200. New H12 covers endpoint enforcement, and its fourth pass condition is the one that matters — a public endpoint written into the database behind the settings API must still be refused at the wire. A build passing the first three and failing that one has configuration validation only. SPECIFICATION.md is deliberately unchanged. M2 altered no product requirement; it removed capability the specification never asked for. The two M2 reports gain appended closeout notes rather than edits. Their original wording about an uncommitted working tree was true when written, and the note records what happened afterwards: the six-file correction is |
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JesseMarkowitzandClaude Opus 5
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8652fe7cd8 |
M2 review: two regressions the green suite hid, and the reports
The post-implementation review of M2, plus the three corrections it took
to make the evidence true. Reports:
planning/reports/M2-BASELINE-REPORT.md 868 lines, the measurements
planning/reports/M2-IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md 758 lines, the reading of them
Verdict is PASS, accept with non-blocking debt, proceed to M3. Every M2
requirement is met and the ones that matter were tested by running the
build rather than reading it: a cloud endpoint written straight into
SQLite with sqlite3, behind the API's back, still refused at the wire;
trusted-LAN HTTPS against the real second machine with verification on;
captures showing zero packets outside loopback and the approved host.
Three defects, all found by running the shipped image.
The memory bank was dead. M2 removed Settings.api_key_plain with the API
key, and memorybank's two provider factories still read it. It failed
inside a fire-and-forget task, so no user error, no log anyone would
read, and no test — every memory test stubs those factories. All 604
tests passed with summaries and embeddings silently not happening.
The configurable model timeout never reached the turn engine. Stored,
validated, exposed in the API, rendered in the UI, and not passed to the
provider. M2's own exit criterion was half met: the constant had moved
but the setting did nothing.
And requirements.lock still pinned quickjs, psycopg and cryptography, so
the setup path DEVELOPMENT.md gives a new developer would have
reinstalled all three.
Both code defects now have the test that would have caught them: one
constructs every provider factory from a real Settings row, one drives
the turn endpoint, the chat endpoint and the summariser and asserts the
configured timeout arrives at each. That is the lesson worth keeping from
this milestone — after removing an attribute, build each consumer from a
real object; after adding a setting, prove it lands. Both failures were
in background or plumbing paths, which is exactly where a subtractive
change cannot see itself.
606 tests pass, up from 604. Lint, build and image are clean. Every
runtime result in the baseline report came from an image built after
these fixes; the reports say plainly that commit
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JesseMarkowitz
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645f07f06d | Add the M1 implementation review report | ||
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JesseMarkowitzandClaude Opus 5
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c1a73b3d77 |
M1: make the first story turn work with no Internet
Phase 0B ran the upstream application on a network with no route out and the first turn died in tiktoken, which downloads its BPE table the first time anything counts a token. The browser separately fetched three font families from Google on every page load. Neither is visible on a machine that has been online once, which is why both now have tests. The tokenizer table is vendored at backend/app/context/vendor/cl100k_base.tiktoken and backend/app/context/encoding.py builds the encoding from it directly, verifying its SHA-256 against the digest tiktoken itself pins for that URL. No code path in the tokenizer can reach the network any more — not a warm cache, not an environment variable a deployment could forget. The encoding was checked token for token against tiktoken's own. The three font families are self-hosted as variable fonts under frontend/public/fonts/ (343 KiB, Latin and Latin Extended), declared in frontend/src/styles/fonts.css, and re-vendored by frontend/tools/vendor_fonts.py. Their OFL licences ship beside them. With no remote asset left, the CSP drops both Google hosts and gains object-src, base-uri and form-action; woff2 also gets its real media type, which Python's table lacks on a slim image. A trusted-LAN Ollama turned out not to work at all over HTTPS. httpx verifies against the certifi bundle, so an endpoint whose certificate comes from a CA the user installed on their own machines — a StartOS server's Ollama, for one — was refused with CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED while curl and the browser on the same host accepted it. app/tlstrust.py builds one context that unions the platform CA store with certifi's, and all four outbound clients use it. A union rather than a swap, so an image with an empty system store cannot start failing on endpoints that worked before. Verification itself is untouched: CERT_REQUIRED, hostname checking on, and no insecure escape hatch. The storyteller listener is now loopback by explicit statement rather than by inheriting uvicorn's default: start.sh, start.ps1, and docker-compose.yml, which publishes to 127.0.0.1 rather than every interface. Reaching an Ollama on another machine is outbound and needs none of that inbound exposure. backend/requirements.lock pins the exact tested closure; requirements.txt keeps the ranges. DEVELOPMENT.md covers setup, the same-host and trusted-LAN Ollama configurations, and how to re-run the offline proof. PROVENANCE.md records the upstream commit, the MIT terms, and both vendored assets. Verified, not just compiled. On an --internal Docker network with 1.1.1.1 unreachable and no name resolving, a campaign was created and played for six turns through same-host Ollama, restarted, and resumed. A second run played ten turns through Ollama on a separate physical machine on the LAN over verified HTTPS, summaries and embeddings included, with the storyteller's default route deleted so the LAN was reachable and the Internet was not. Its capture: 893 packets to the approved host, 730 loopback, zero anywhere else, and zero DNS queries. Two induced model failures left the accepted story bit-identical. The inherited SPA was opened in a browser and a campaign read back from it. Evidence is in planning/reports/M1-BASELINE-REPORT.md, along with the findings that did not belong in this change. 648 backend tests pass, up from the inherited 632; frontend lint and build are clean; the image builds. No M2 work is included: the hosted, cloud, analytics, Postgres and scripting surfaces are untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017foPNqFjAJa2Ngebf5mEfL |
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JesseMarkowitz
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717670afe0 | Update planning package after Phase 0B | ||
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JesseMarkowitzandClaude Opus 5
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ba737de9b4 |
Add Phase 0B local validation findings and recommendation
Validates the three finalists by clone, build, test run and live local Ollama inference, then answers the fork question with measurements rather than static review. Recommendation: fork AI-DnD, confidence high. The Phase 0A call holds, but it was wrong that AI-DnD's undo is non-destructive — retry preserves the replaced take, undo hard-deletes it. A follow-up spike fixed that in 3 files (+130/-31): undo now moves a head cursor, redo round-trips, writing below a moved-back head forks and keeps the abandoned line, branch-scoped memory isolation survives, suite 627/632 with all 5 failures asserting the deleted-row behaviour that was replaced. Findings that change the plan: - AI-DnD cannot take a turn air-gapped as shipped; tiktoken fetches its encoding from a CDN. Proven on an internal Docker network, proven fixed by vendoring the file. - ai-adventure needs zero code for Ollama — two config lines — and its turn/head/checkpoint schema is the target model to build to. - Open Dungeon has zero automated tests and a positional summary watermark, making its branch retrofit larger than Phase 0A costed. - The world-state referee takes relative deltas; a 3B model sent absolute values under full context, so a wounded player ended at full health. Validation cannot catch this, so prefer ai-adventure's typed-event vocabulary when generalising narrative state. - Export/import recomputes head depth, so a round-trip silently undoes an undo. Must be fixed alongside the undo work. Docs only; no production code. Working tree from the runs stays untracked under phase0b/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015gUPLuxLs8wypxZPEmccJu |
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JesseMarkowitz
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f011362494 | Add initial planning files from ChatGPT research here |