87a40326a29533c8d52c9f9f41022e7b499b1de7
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 JesseMarkowitz
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87a40326a2 |
v1.1: harden recovery and control boundaries
WP-D and WP-E complete the planned v1.1 implementation packages. WP-D — recovery honesty: - backups verify the completed copy with PRAGMA integrity_check - corruption missed by quick_check is detected by the full check - existing good backups remain protected - oversized exports are still delivered but declare whether this version can import them, while the 20 MB import limit remains unchanged - backup was exercised through the real browser UI on both the normal campaign database and a campaign-shaped database over 100 MB WP-E — control-boundary contrast: - interactive control boundaries meet the WCAG 1.4.11 3:1 target - the contrast audit is now a failing gate rather than an advisory - rendered browser measurements pass for the composer, controls, tabs and nav - text contrast and focus visibility remain intact - owner reviewed and approved the before/after screenshots Reports: - planning/reports/v1.1/V1.1-WP-D-REPORT.md - planning/reports/v1.1/V1.1-WP-E-REPORT.md All planned v1.1 work packages A-E are now complete. Release validation has not yet begun. |
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JesseMarkowitz
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8c65ae99de |
M2: cut the hosted product away from the local one
94 files, +1,395 -6,578. Three files are new; twenty-four are gone. The milestone is subtraction, and what is left is the single-user local storyteller the specification describes. Removed in full: campaign scripting and its QuickJS sandbox; multi-user accounts, guest sessions, login, registration and the shared demo key; the visitor-analytics tables, dashboard and page beacon; the access log of sign-ins, addresses and devices; per-IP and per-user rate limiting and quotas; Render deployment config; Postgres and psycopg; cloud inference providers, the API-key field and the key encryption that existed to store it; session-cookie signing. None of it was hidden behind a flag — the routes are gone and answer 404. Two things were kept that the brief allowed keeping. The `users` table and its foreign keys stay as an internal ownership detail, because rewriting them out means a migration across most of the schema to delete a column that costs nothing; nothing creates a second user and no request carries an identity. Five inert tables and four inert columns stay for the same reason, so an M1 campaign database opens unchanged. The one addition is app/endpoints.py, which decides where a story may be sent. Loopback, RFC1918, link-local, unique-local and CGNAT — an explicit allowlist of networks, not a guess at what `ipaddress` means by "private", which calls the documentation ranges private and IPv6 loopback reserved. Every address a hostname resolves to must be in it, so a split answer does not squeak through, and the rule runs both when the endpoint is saved and before every outbound request, because a name that resolved to the LAN this morning can resolve elsewhere this afternoon. Known cloud hosts are named in the refusal so the error says why rather than looking like broken DNS. TLS is never traded against it: M1's shared trust context is intact on all four clients and there is no way to skip verification. The hardcoded 120-second model timeout is now a setting. That was not theoretical — on this GPU-less four-core host a cold load of qwen2.5:3b-instruct took 648.9 seconds to produce the first turn, while turns 2 to 5 of the same campaign took 3.6 to 13.1. Connect stays short at 10s so a wrong address still fails fast; the read timeout defaults to 300s and is bounded at 3600, because "wait longer" must stay a number. Two defects found while testing and fixed here. An unknown /api path fell through the SPA catch-all and came back as HTML with status 200, so a client asking for JSON parsed a web page instead of learning the route was gone. And AIDND_CORS_ORIGINS accepted "*", which on an unauthenticated loopback API would hand every page on the Internet a write handle on the campaign database; it now refuses to start. Verified rather than assumed. Offline, on a network with no route out and no DNS: five turns, retry with both takes retained, restart with an identical transcript digest, a failed model call leaving the accepted AI-turn count untouched, and a capture with zero non-loopback unicast packets. Against a real second machine on the LAN over HTTPS with a private CA: four turns, restart, and a capture showing 289 packets to the approved host, 344 loopback, zero anywhere else, zero DNS queries. Cloud and public endpoints refused with their reasons; no API key settable; every removed route 404. 604 backend tests pass, down from 648 by the fifteen retired with the subsystems they tested and up by the twenty-nine added for the endpoint policy and the removed surface. The scripting tests were not deleted: eight files used a JavaScript counter as instrumentation for the state snapshot and rollback machinery, which M2 does not touch, so the counter moved to the world-state engine and those tests still assert what they always did. Frontend lint and build are clean; the image builds, and its wheel-building stage is gone with quickjs. No M3 work. Undo is still destructive and there is still no Redo. |
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Parth
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e7d75c3b05 |
Rewrite Python comments in Google developer documentation style (#12)
* Rewrite comments in Google developer documentation style Rewrite the comments and docstrings across the backend core modules so they read plainly. The previous prose was accurate but dense and figurative, which made it slow to skim. Applies the Google developer documentation style guide: short sentences, active voice, present tense, American spelling, and no metaphors, idioms, or rhetorical asides. Replaces em-dash chains with separate sentences. |
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parththakkar106andClaude Opus 5
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041f9e25f3 |
Count the visits, and say whether anyone got anywhere
A hosted demo raises a question a local app never does: is anyone using it, and do they reach the part that matters? `/analytics` answers it — visitors, pages, referrers, countries, devices, which shared scenarios get played, turns and demo-key spend, API and turn errors, and a funnel from visited to played a turn to signed up. Not a third-party script, for reasons specific to this one. The CSP allows `script-src 'self'`, so a tracker means loosening it; adblockers eat the popular ones, which silently biases exactly the technical audience this project gets shown to; and none of them can see the measurement that actually matters here, which is a turn, not a pageview. **A visit is a write and never a read.** After the 189x egress fix it would be perverse to add a feature that reads rows per request, so counts accumulate in a process-local dict and flush every 60s as UPSERTs. Storage is a generic `(day, metric, label) -> hits` counter, so measuring something new later costs a constant rather than a migration, plus one row per visitor per day for the funnel flags. Every dashboard query is a GROUP BY returning tens of rows however much traffic sits behind it; a month reads back in a few kilobytes. The buffer's cost is that a hard restart can lose up to a minute — the flusher also runs on shutdown, and a tier that sleeps when idle sleeps on an empty buffer anyway. **The counters are anonymous; the access log beside them is not, on purpose.** A visitor is `HMAC(secret, "visitor:<user id>")` truncated to 32 chars — one-way, so `analytics_daily` and `analytics_visitor_days` cannot be joined back to `users`, and keyed, so no client can compute one. Story content never reaches that module, and the only content it ever names is a seeded public scenario's title; a player's own titles are theirs. `accesslog.py` is the identifying half and is a separate module writing a separate table so that separation is a property of the code rather than a convention: `access_events` records sessions, sign-ins, registrations and failed attempts with address, email and device, read on a second tab of the same page behind the same gate. Both halves are gated on `AIDND_ANALYTICS_EMAILS`, not `POWER_USERS`. An unmetered tester is not automatically someone who should see the traffic. The route 404s and the nav link is absent for everyone else, the same treatment AI Chat gets; unset in a hosted deploy means nobody sees it, including me. Three things came out of building it that a test would not have suggested. **A failed turn is an HTTP 200 with a bad ending.** The status-code middleware cannot see one, so a demo whose model had started refusing every request would look perfectly healthy from outside. All five SSE error paths in `_generate_turn` now go through a `turn_error()` helper that counts on the way out. Error buckets elsewhere are labelled by the matched route template rather than the requested path — one bucket per endpoint instead of one per adventure id, and, the reason it isn't merely tidier, an unmatched path is entirely attacker-chosen, so labelling by it would let anyone mint rows. **The funnel counts people, not clicks.** A player who starts six adventures is one person who started an adventure. That is the whole reason the per-visitor-day table exists; its flags only ever turn on, and `is_new` is settled by the first write of a visitor's first day. **The tests run on SQLite and production is Neon.** A flush that raises is caught and logged, so a dialect mistake in the UPSERTs would have stayed invisible until the dashboard quietly never filled. `test_the_upserts_compile_for_postgres` compiles both statements against the Postgres dialect without connecting to one. Two things this leans on elsewhere. `limits._client_ip` is now public `client_ip`: the access log needs the same answer, and two functions both deciding which hop is the caller's is how one of them ends up trusting a header it shouldn't. And the cleanup sweeper now starts if *either* job has work — a deployment can keep every guest forever and still want its visitor-day rows aged out. No migration. Both tables are new and `bootstrap()` calls `create_all` on existing databases too, the route `branches` took in Phase 14, so `LATEST_VERSION` is still 64. 497 tests green, frontend lint and build clean, driven by hand against a synthetic 90-day fixture at 1568px. The narrow-screen layout follows the existing 720px block but is unverified: `resize_window` is ignored on a maximized Chrome and `frame-ancestors 'none'` rules out checking it in a sized iframe. Also repaired here: a rename in test_ratelimit_hardening.py had run through the test names themselves, leaving `testclient_ip_*` — still collected by pytest, which is why it passed unnoticed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DfMCsN1KBLsTqMkj5hSgrY |
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parththakkar106andClaude Opus 5
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a7bf47a35e |
Let a backup carry a story that went two ways
A bundle had one list and a forked adventure has two stories, so export was emitting every branch's turns interleaved by index — a mangled story rather than lost data, and unreachable only because forking has no UI yet. `ai-dnd-adventure-v2` carries the branches, the depth each one left its parent at, which attempt at every turn is the story, and what each node left behind. That last one is not decoration: the after-snapshots are what a branch switch puts back, and a bundle without them imports a tree nobody can switch inside. `app/bundle.py` owns both formats and nothing else knows either. The v1 reader stays — those files are already on people's disks — and it is now the only place a `variants` array exists anywhere. The rule the module is built on is that a bundle carries what was chosen and never what is derived. The head branch, the fork points, the live flags and the anchors are decisions somebody made. The lineage, the head depth, the legacy `index` and the variant ordinals are computed from those and are rebuilt on the way in, because a bundle is a text file anybody can edit and a derived field shipped beside its source is a chance for the file to disagree with itself where no read would report it. `index` is the one that stops being academic here. It agreed with `depth` until SP5, and this is the first writer that has to fill it for a forked story, where two branches both hold a node at depth 4. It is allocated one per turn instead: siblings share it, no two coordinates do. Everything a hand-edited file can get wrong about the shape of a tree is a 400 raised before the adventure row exists, because a half-applied import is exactly the failure this phase exists to end — a story that goes quiet. A file wrong about which attempt is live is corrected rather than refused; that is an invariant of the database, not of the format. Measured on the 600-action fixture: 587 kB to 911 kB, and all of the increase is the outcomes at 489 B a node — the coordinates themselves save 57.5 B a node against the old turn-and-variants shape. Twenty forks add 660 B. 4.3% of the import body cap. 381 tests green, 16 of them new in test_bundle_v2.py. No migration, no vacuum owed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015H5qiyiR7gtFQaoDphHZ3g |
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parththakkar106andClaude Opus 5
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563b9af9cf |
Read one story, and know which one
Every read of an action now goes through a single module. `context/lineage.py` turns a branch's stored lineage into the OR-of-ranges that is "this story", and history, paging, the newest-action lookups, the index screen and the scripting history API all select through it. A forgotten clause does not raise — it quietly assembles a page, or a prompt, out of two different stories — so the clause lives in one place rather than in a convention. The read that mattered most was the shortcut: `_from_memory` sliced `adventure.actions`, which is every branch's actions, not the path. It now cuts the loaded collection down with the same predicate the SQL uses. Same trap one layer up, and user-visible: `pipeline._history()` hands user scripts the story, and was handing them the collection. Tail reads window the lineage as well as the rows: the newest few entries cover the context budget, so a story forked twenty times reads its tail with one clause and costs 1.07x what an unforked story of the same length costs. The estimate is depth arithmetic, and where a deleted action leaves a gap the read notices it came up short and widens to the whole ancestry. Ordering moves from `index` to `depth`, with `id` breaking ties. The two hold the same numbers until retry stops mutating rows in SP4, but only one of them is a position along a path. One thing SP1 did not anticipate: wiring the writers was not enough. From here a row without a branch is a row no read can see, and "every writer remembers" has to hold for every fixture, script and test ever written — including the SP0 baseline, which writes its actions straight to the database and must pass unmodified. So the session enforces it: `tree.place_new_nodes` runs from before_flush and places anything unplaced. The call sites keep their explicit calls, because a node placed at the call site is placed before the code around it reads it back. 316 tests green: the 297 from SP1, plus 19 in test_branch_clause.py. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017Dvvqn9ZDR4ixeFPHNbww7 |
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parththakkar106andClaude Opus 4.8
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c500203270 |
Harden auth against a forwarded-header rate-limit bypass, and guard BYOK SSRF
The per-IP rate limits could be bypassed entirely: uvicorn ran with --forwarded-allow-ips "*", which trusts the leftmost X-Forwarded-For value (client-controlled), and Render forwards the inbound header rather than stripping it. Rotating the header handed out a fresh rate-limit bucket per request, so the login/register limit (10/5min) and guest-minting limit (30/5min) were no throttle at all — unbounded password guessing and guest-row creation. Confirmed live: fixed IP -> 429 after 10; rotating spoofed header -> no 429 across 14 attempts. Two-layer fix: - limits._client_ip now derives the client IP from the hop the trusted edge appends (rightmost of X-Forwarded-For), which a client can't spoof past; tunable via AIDND_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. Dropped --forwarded-allow-ips "*". - New per-account login throttle (email-keyed, 8 fails / 15 min, cleared on success): stops distributed guessing against one account that a per-IP limit can't, since it can't be diluted across many source addresses. Also close an SSRF on the BYOK endpoint_url (hosted mode only): the connection test and turn/chat streams now refuse a URL that resolves to a non-public address (private/loopback/link-local metadata/reserved), checked at request time so it resists a DNS record flipping to a private IP. No-op locally, where reaching localhost Ollama is intended. Tests: test_ratelimit_hardening.py (8), test_netguard.py (13). 172 pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015CYEJKobJ2Re4Dv7qUoSA7 |
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parththakkar106andClaude Opus 5
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1dd31086c1 |
Add power-user AI Chat page; centralize demo-key model pinning
AI Chat is a plain scratchpad for talking to a model directly — no story context, scripts or world state — for poking at models, prompts and endpoints without starting an adventure. Power users only: the router 404s (rather than 403s) for everyone else and the nav link is hidden. The conversation lives in localStorage, so there's no new table or migration. is_power_user() now also returns True in local mode: it's the operator's own machine and their own key, the same reasoning that makes the provider debug log local-only. Alongside that, the rule keeping the shared demo key off paid models now lives in exactly one place. It had been duplicated into the chat router, which is how one copy eventually drifts: - resolve_provider_config() takes an optional model_override and is the only place the whitelist is applied, so turns, AI Chat and the connection test all inherit it. An override is a per-request preference, never a grant. - ProviderConfig.__post_init__ refuses to exist when api_key is the demo key and the model isn't whitelisted. It keys on the key itself rather than the using_demo flag, so a mislabelled config can't slip past, and it raises so a future path that bypasses the resolver fails loudly instead of billing. - The demo branch still pins endpoint_url too — a user-controlled endpoint would leak the key itself, which is worse than spending it. Provider gained chat(messages, ...) beside generate(), both delegating to a shared _stream(url, body); completion-mode endpoints get the messages flattened into a labelled transcript. Settings' /models fetch moved to list_endpoint_models() and is shared with /api/chat/config. Tests: 10 new in tests/test_chat.py (70 total). These deliberately do not stub resolve_provider_config — the point is to exercise the real BYOK-vs-demo decision and assert on what the provider actually received: off-whitelist override pinned, off-whitelist Settings.model pinned, redirected endpoint pinned, BYOK passed through untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FGY1yvzSeKgTtRfeVtDmx |
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parththakkar106andClaude Opus 4.8
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4772171b6c |
Phase 9: production hardening
Config via env, abuse/resource limits, and production serving so the app is safe to expose publicly: - Fail-fast on missing SECRET_KEY when MULTI_USER=true - quickjs per-execution time/memory limits (while(true) can't hang server) - Per-user/per-IP rate limiting on turn/script/auth endpoints - Request body size limit + per-user row caps - Security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options, nosniff, referrer-policy) incl. SSE - Debug router 403 and /docs disabled in multi-user mode - DATABASE_URL support (defaults to Neon Postgres) alongside SQLite - Documented all env vars in backend/.env.example Verified locally via uvicorn (MULTI_USER=1, SQLite); see plan/09-phase-hardening.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017e6tQuojBLYPetUfmhit4X |