Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
parththakkar106andClaude Opus 4.8 c500203270 Harden auth against a forwarded-header rate-limit bypass, and guard BYOK SSRF
The per-IP rate limits could be bypassed entirely: uvicorn ran with
--forwarded-allow-ips "*", which trusts the leftmost X-Forwarded-For value
(client-controlled), and Render forwards the inbound header rather than
stripping it. Rotating the header handed out a fresh rate-limit bucket per
request, so the login/register limit (10/5min) and guest-minting limit
(30/5min) were no throttle at all — unbounded password guessing and guest-row
creation. Confirmed live: fixed IP -> 429 after 10; rotating spoofed header ->
no 429 across 14 attempts.

Two-layer fix:
- limits._client_ip now derives the client IP from the hop the trusted edge
  appends (rightmost of X-Forwarded-For), which a client can't spoof past;
  tunable via AIDND_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. Dropped --forwarded-allow-ips "*".
- New per-account login throttle (email-keyed, 8 fails / 15 min, cleared on
  success): stops distributed guessing against one account that a per-IP limit
  can't, since it can't be diluted across many source addresses.

Also close an SSRF on the BYOK endpoint_url (hosted mode only): the connection
test and turn/chat streams now refuse a URL that resolves to a non-public
address (private/loopback/link-local metadata/reserved), checked at request
time so it resists a DNS record flipping to a private IP. No-op locally, where
reaching localhost Ollama is intended.

Tests: test_ratelimit_hardening.py (8), test_netguard.py (13). 172 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015CYEJKobJ2Re4Dv7qUoSA7
2026-08-15 13:47:14 +05:30
parththakkar106andClaude Opus 4.8 4772171b6c Phase 9: production hardening
Config via env, abuse/resource limits, and production serving so the app
is safe to expose publicly:

- Fail-fast on missing SECRET_KEY when MULTI_USER=true
- quickjs per-execution time/memory limits (while(true) can't hang server)
- Per-user/per-IP rate limiting on turn/script/auth endpoints
- Request body size limit + per-user row caps
- Security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options, nosniff, referrer-policy) incl. SSE
- Debug router 403 and /docs disabled in multi-user mode
- DATABASE_URL support (defaults to Neon Postgres) alongside SQLite
- Documented all env vars in backend/.env.example

Verified locally via uvicorn (MULTI_USER=1, SQLite); see plan/09-phase-hardening.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017e6tQuojBLYPetUfmhit4X
2026-07-07 12:30:06 +05:30
parththakkar106andClaude Fable 5 b711b573b5 Dockerfile: node 24 to match the npm 11 lockfile
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KFsGHju9szibJJa2YJcdbg
2026-07-06 17:00:43 +05:30
parththakkar106andClaude Fable 5 22630c8411 Phase 7: MIT license, portfolio README, Docker, cross-platform start
- LICENSE: MIT
- README: rewritten as portfolio-grade docs (features with code pointers,
  architecture, Docker/Windows/macOS quick starts, BYO-model table)
- Dockerfile (3-stage: SPA build, pip wheels, slim runtime) + compose with
  a /data volume; .dockerignore keeps secrets and local data out
- database.py: AIDND_DB_PATH env override so deployments can relocate the
  SQLite file; documented in backend/.env.example
- start.sh: macOS/Linux dev script with first-run setup

Verified locally: production SPA build served by the backend (deep links
OK), DB created at the override path. Docker image itself untested here
(Docker not installed); flagged in plan/07.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KFsGHju9szibJJa2YJcdbg
2026-07-06 16:51:48 +05:30