interactive-story

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Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
parththakkar106andClaude Opus 5	041f9e25f3	Count the visits, and say whether anyone got anywhere A hosted demo raises a question a local app never does: is anyone using it, and do they reach the part that matters? `/analytics` answers it — visitors, pages, referrers, countries, devices, which shared scenarios get played, turns and demo-key spend, API and turn errors, and a funnel from visited to played a turn to signed up. Not a third-party script, for reasons specific to this one. The CSP allows `script-src 'self'`, so a tracker means loosening it; adblockers eat the popular ones, which silently biases exactly the technical audience this project gets shown to; and none of them can see the measurement that actually matters here, which is a turn, not a pageview. A visit is a write and never a read. After the 189x egress fix it would be perverse to add a feature that reads rows per request, so counts accumulate in a process-local dict and flush every 60s as UPSERTs. Storage is a generic `(day, metric, label) -> hits` counter, so measuring something new later costs a constant rather than a migration, plus one row per visitor per day for the funnel flags. Every dashboard query is a GROUP BY returning tens of rows however much traffic sits behind it; a month reads back in a few kilobytes. The buffer's cost is that a hard restart can lose up to a minute — the flusher also runs on shutdown, and a tier that sleeps when idle sleeps on an empty buffer anyway. The counters are anonymous; the access log beside them is not, on purpose. A visitor is `HMAC(secret, "visitor:<user id>")` truncated to 32 chars — one-way, so `analytics_daily` and `analytics_visitor_days` cannot be joined back to `users`, and keyed, so no client can compute one. Story content never reaches that module, and the only content it ever names is a seeded public scenario's title; a player's own titles are theirs. `accesslog.py` is the identifying half and is a separate module writing a separate table so that separation is a property of the code rather than a convention: `access_events` records sessions, sign-ins, registrations and failed attempts with address, email and device, read on a second tab of the same page behind the same gate. Both halves are gated on `AIDND_ANALYTICS_EMAILS`, not `POWER_USERS`. An unmetered tester is not automatically someone who should see the traffic. The route 404s and the nav link is absent for everyone else, the same treatment AI Chat gets; unset in a hosted deploy means nobody sees it, including me. Three things came out of building it that a test would not have suggested. A failed turn is an HTTP 200 with a bad ending. The status-code middleware cannot see one, so a demo whose model had started refusing every request would look perfectly healthy from outside. All five SSE error paths in `_generate_turn` now go through a `turn_error()` helper that counts on the way out. Error buckets elsewhere are labelled by the matched route template rather than the requested path — one bucket per endpoint instead of one per adventure id, and, the reason it isn't merely tidier, an unmatched path is entirely attacker-chosen, so labelling by it would let anyone mint rows. The funnel counts people, not clicks. A player who starts six adventures is one person who started an adventure. That is the whole reason the per-visitor-day table exists; its flags only ever turn on, and `is_new` is settled by the first write of a visitor's first day. The tests run on SQLite and production is Neon. A flush that raises is caught and logged, so a dialect mistake in the UPSERTs would have stayed invisible until the dashboard quietly never filled. `test_the_upserts_compile_for_postgres` compiles both statements against the Postgres dialect without connecting to one. Two things this leans on elsewhere. `limits._client_ip` is now public `client_ip`: the access log needs the same answer, and two functions both deciding which hop is the caller's is how one of them ends up trusting a header it shouldn't. And the cleanup sweeper now starts if either job has work — a deployment can keep every guest forever and still want its visitor-day rows aged out. No migration. Both tables are new and `bootstrap()` calls `create_all` on existing databases too, the route `branches` took in Phase 14, so `LATEST_VERSION` is still 64. 497 tests green, frontend lint and build clean, driven by hand against a synthetic 90-day fixture at 1568px. The narrow-screen layout follows the existing 720px block but is unverified: `resize_window` is ignored on a maximized Chrome and `frame-ancestors 'none'` rules out checking it in a sized iframe. Also repaired here: a rename in test_ratelimit_hardening.py had run through the test names themselves, leaving `testclient_ip_*` — still collected by pytest, which is why it passed unnoticed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DfMCsN1KBLsTqMkj5hSgrY	2026-08-22 16:24:42 +05:30
parththakkar106andClaude Opus 4.8	c500203270	Harden auth against a forwarded-header rate-limit bypass, and guard BYOK SSRF The per-IP rate limits could be bypassed entirely: uvicorn ran with --forwarded-allow-ips "", which trusts the leftmost X-Forwarded-For value (client-controlled), and Render forwards the inbound header rather than stripping it. Rotating the header handed out a fresh rate-limit bucket per request, so the login/register limit (10/5min) and guest-minting limit (30/5min) were no throttle at all — unbounded password guessing and guest-row creation. Confirmed live: fixed IP -> 429 after 10; rotating spoofed header -> no 429 across 14 attempts. Two-layer fix: - limits._client_ip now derives the client IP from the hop the trusted edge appends (rightmost of X-Forwarded-For), which a client can't spoof past; tunable via AIDND_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. Dropped --forwarded-allow-ips "". - New per-account login throttle (email-keyed, 8 fails / 15 min, cleared on success): stops distributed guessing against one account that a per-IP limit can't, since it can't be diluted across many source addresses. Also close an SSRF on the BYOK endpoint_url (hosted mode only): the connection test and turn/chat streams now refuse a URL that resolves to a non-public address (private/loopback/link-local metadata/reserved), checked at request time so it resists a DNS record flipping to a private IP. No-op locally, where reaching localhost Ollama is intended. Tests: test_ratelimit_hardening.py (8), test_netguard.py (13). 172 pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015CYEJKobJ2Re4Dv7qUoSA7	2026-08-15 13:47:14 +05:30

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

parththakkar106andClaude Opus 5

041f9e25f3

Count the visits, and say whether anyone got anywhere

A hosted demo raises a question a local app never does: is anyone using it,
and do they reach the part that matters? `/analytics` answers it — visitors,
pages, referrers, countries, devices, which shared scenarios get played, turns
and demo-key spend, API and turn errors, and a funnel from visited to played a
turn to signed up.

Not a third-party script, for reasons specific to this one. The CSP allows
`script-src 'self'`, so a tracker means loosening it; adblockers eat the
popular ones, which silently biases exactly the technical audience this
project gets shown to; and none of them can see the measurement that actually
matters here, which is a turn, not a pageview.

**A visit is a write and never a read.** After the 189x egress fix it would be
perverse to add a feature that reads rows per request, so counts accumulate in
a process-local dict and flush every 60s as UPSERTs. Storage is a generic
`(day, metric, label) -> hits` counter, so measuring something new later costs
a constant rather than a migration, plus one row per visitor per day for the
funnel flags. Every dashboard query is a GROUP BY returning tens of rows
however much traffic sits behind it; a month reads back in a few kilobytes.
The buffer's cost is that a hard restart can lose up to a minute — the flusher
also runs on shutdown, and a tier that sleeps when idle sleeps on an empty
buffer anyway.

**The counters are anonymous; the access log beside them is not, on purpose.**
A visitor is `HMAC(secret, "visitor:<user id>")` truncated to 32 chars —
one-way, so `analytics_daily` and `analytics_visitor_days` cannot be joined
back to `users`, and keyed, so no client can compute one. Story content never
reaches that module, and the only content it ever names is a seeded public
scenario's title; a player's own titles are theirs. `accesslog.py` is the
identifying half and is a separate module writing a separate table so that
separation is a property of the code rather than a convention: `access_events`
records sessions, sign-ins, registrations and failed attempts with address,
email and device, read on a second tab of the same page behind the same gate.

Both halves are gated on `AIDND_ANALYTICS_EMAILS`, not `POWER_USERS`. An
unmetered tester is not automatically someone who should see the traffic. The
route 404s and the nav link is absent for everyone else, the same treatment
AI Chat gets; unset in a hosted deploy means nobody sees it, including me.

Three things came out of building it that a test would not have suggested.

**A failed turn is an HTTP 200 with a bad ending.** The status-code middleware
cannot see one, so a demo whose model had started refusing every request would
look perfectly healthy from outside. All five SSE error paths in
`_generate_turn` now go through a `turn_error()` helper that counts on the way
out. Error buckets elsewhere are labelled by the matched route template rather
than the requested path — one bucket per endpoint instead of one per adventure
id, and, the reason it isn't merely tidier, an unmatched path is entirely
attacker-chosen, so labelling by it would let anyone mint rows.

**The funnel counts people, not clicks.** A player who starts six adventures
is one person who started an adventure. That is the whole reason the
per-visitor-day table exists; its flags only ever turn on, and `is_new` is
settled by the first write of a visitor's first day.

**The tests run on SQLite and production is Neon.** A flush that raises is
caught and logged, so a dialect mistake in the UPSERTs would have stayed
invisible until the dashboard quietly never filled.
`test_the_upserts_compile_for_postgres` compiles both statements against the
Postgres dialect without connecting to one.

Two things this leans on elsewhere. `limits._client_ip` is now public
`client_ip`: the access log needs the same answer, and two functions both
deciding which hop is the caller's is how one of them ends up trusting a
header it shouldn't. And the cleanup sweeper now starts if *either* job has
work — a deployment can keep every guest forever and still want its
visitor-day rows aged out.

No migration. Both tables are new and `bootstrap()` calls `create_all` on
existing databases too, the route `branches` took in Phase 14, so
`LATEST_VERSION` is still 64.

497 tests green, frontend lint and build clean, driven by hand against a
synthetic 90-day fixture at 1568px. The narrow-screen layout follows the
existing 720px block but is unverified: `resize_window` is ignored on a
maximized Chrome and `frame-ancestors 'none'` rules out checking it in a sized
iframe. Also repaired here: a rename in test_ratelimit_hardening.py had run
through the test names themselves, leaving `testclient_ip_*` — still collected
by pytest, which is why it passed unnoticed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DfMCsN1KBLsTqMkj5hSgrY

2026-08-22 16:24:42 +05:30

parththakkar106andClaude Opus 4.8

c500203270

Harden auth against a forwarded-header rate-limit bypass, and guard BYOK SSRF

The per-IP rate limits could be bypassed entirely: uvicorn ran with
--forwarded-allow-ips "*", which trusts the leftmost X-Forwarded-For value
(client-controlled), and Render forwards the inbound header rather than
stripping it. Rotating the header handed out a fresh rate-limit bucket per
request, so the login/register limit (10/5min) and guest-minting limit
(30/5min) were no throttle at all — unbounded password guessing and guest-row
creation. Confirmed live: fixed IP -> 429 after 10; rotating spoofed header ->
no 429 across 14 attempts.

Two-layer fix:
- limits._client_ip now derives the client IP from the hop the trusted edge
  appends (rightmost of X-Forwarded-For), which a client can't spoof past;
  tunable via AIDND_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. Dropped --forwarded-allow-ips "*".
- New per-account login throttle (email-keyed, 8 fails / 15 min, cleared on
  success): stops distributed guessing against one account that a per-IP limit
  can't, since it can't be diluted across many source addresses.

Also close an SSRF on the BYOK endpoint_url (hosted mode only): the connection
test and turn/chat streams now refuse a URL that resolves to a non-public
address (private/loopback/link-local metadata/reserved), checked at request
time so it resists a DNS record flipping to a private IP. No-op locally, where
reaching localhost Ollama is intended.

Tests: test_ratelimit_hardening.py (8), test_netguard.py (13). 172 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015CYEJKobJ2Re4Dv7qUoSA7

2026-08-15 13:47:14 +05:30