2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
JesseMarkowitzandClaude Opus 5	8652fe7cd8	M2 review: two regressions the green suite hid, and the reports ... The post-implementation review of M2, plus the three corrections it took to make the evidence true. Reports: planning/reports/M2-BASELINE-REPORT.md 868 lines, the measurements planning/reports/M2-IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md 758 lines, the reading of them Verdict is PASS, accept with non-blocking debt, proceed to M3. Every M2 requirement is met and the ones that matter were tested by running the build rather than reading it: a cloud endpoint written straight into SQLite with sqlite3, behind the API's back, still refused at the wire; trusted-LAN HTTPS against the real second machine with verification on; captures showing zero packets outside loopback and the approved host. Three defects, all found by running the shipped image. The memory bank was dead. M2 removed Settings.api_key_plain with the API key, and memorybank's two provider factories still read it. It failed inside a fire-and-forget task, so no user error, no log anyone would read, and no test — every memory test stubs those factories. All 604 tests passed with summaries and embeddings silently not happening. The configurable model timeout never reached the turn engine. Stored, validated, exposed in the API, rendered in the UI, and not passed to the provider. M2's own exit criterion was half met: the constant had moved but the setting did nothing. And requirements.lock still pinned quickjs, psycopg and cryptography, so the setup path DEVELOPMENT.md gives a new developer would have reinstalled all three. Both code defects now have the test that would have caught them: one constructs every provider factory from a real Settings row, one drives the turn endpoint, the chat endpoint and the summariser and asserts the configured timeout arrives at each. That is the lesson worth keeping from this milestone — after removing an attribute, build each consumer from a real object; after adding a setting, prove it lands. Both failures were in background or plumbing paths, which is exactly where a subtractive change cannot see itself. 606 tests pass, up from 604. Lint, build and image are clean. Every runtime result in the baseline report came from an image built after these fixes; the reports say plainly that commit 8c65ae9 itself does not contain them. Also recorded: 88 test node IDs disappeared and every one is accounted for — 64 whole files whose subject was removed, 5 replaced by a better file, 15 individually retired with their features, and 4 renames. No meaningful coverage was lost, and the eight files that used a JavaScript counter as instrumentation kept their assertions by moving the counter to the world-state engine. Six planning recommendations are reported, not applied. Three are marked before M3: the threat model still describes the inherited SSRF guard's opposite rule, TECHNICAL-DESIGN §5.1 still marks two hardening items open, and the endpoint policy is a load-bearing security decision that exists only as a module docstring and deserves an ADR. M3 is clear to start. Its chokepoints are untouched or simplified — the rollback paths now carry one shared state instead of two — and the Phase 0B undo/redo spike still applies. No M3 work here: Undo still deletes and there is still no Redo. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017foPNqFjAJa2Ngebf5mEfL	2026-09-02 15:07:33 -04:00
JesseMarkowitz	8c65ae99de	M2: cut the hosted product away from the local one ... 94 files, +1,395 -6,578. Three files are new; twenty-four are gone. The milestone is subtraction, and what is left is the single-user local storyteller the specification describes. Removed in full: campaign scripting and its QuickJS sandbox; multi-user accounts, guest sessions, login, registration and the shared demo key; the visitor-analytics tables, dashboard and page beacon; the access log of sign-ins, addresses and devices; per-IP and per-user rate limiting and quotas; Render deployment config; Postgres and psycopg; cloud inference providers, the API-key field and the key encryption that existed to store it; session-cookie signing. None of it was hidden behind a flag — the routes are gone and answer 404. Two things were kept that the brief allowed keeping. The `users` table and its foreign keys stay as an internal ownership detail, because rewriting them out means a migration across most of the schema to delete a column that costs nothing; nothing creates a second user and no request carries an identity. Five inert tables and four inert columns stay for the same reason, so an M1 campaign database opens unchanged. The one addition is app/endpoints.py, which decides where a story may be sent. Loopback, RFC1918, link-local, unique-local and CGNAT — an explicit allowlist of networks, not a guess at what `ipaddress` means by "private", which calls the documentation ranges private and IPv6 loopback reserved. Every address a hostname resolves to must be in it, so a split answer does not squeak through, and the rule runs both when the endpoint is saved and before every outbound request, because a name that resolved to the LAN this morning can resolve elsewhere this afternoon. Known cloud hosts are named in the refusal so the error says why rather than looking like broken DNS. TLS is never traded against it: M1's shared trust context is intact on all four clients and there is no way to skip verification. The hardcoded 120-second model timeout is now a setting. That was not theoretical — on this GPU-less four-core host a cold load of qwen2.5:3b-instruct took 648.9 seconds to produce the first turn, while turns 2 to 5 of the same campaign took 3.6 to 13.1. Connect stays short at 10s so a wrong address still fails fast; the read timeout defaults to 300s and is bounded at 3600, because "wait longer" must stay a number. Two defects found while testing and fixed here. An unknown /api path fell through the SPA catch-all and came back as HTML with status 200, so a client asking for JSON parsed a web page instead of learning the route was gone. And AIDND_CORS_ORIGINS accepted "*", which on an unauthenticated loopback API would hand every page on the Internet a write handle on the campaign database; it now refuses to start. Verified rather than assumed. Offline, on a network with no route out and no DNS: five turns, retry with both takes retained, restart with an identical transcript digest, a failed model call leaving the accepted AI-turn count untouched, and a capture with zero non-loopback unicast packets. Against a real second machine on the LAN over HTTPS with a private CA: four turns, restart, and a capture showing 289 packets to the approved host, 344 loopback, zero anywhere else, zero DNS queries. Cloud and public endpoints refused with their reasons; no API key settable; every removed route 404. 604 backend tests pass, down from 648 by the fifteen retired with the subsystems they tested and up by the twenty-nine added for the endpoint policy and the removed surface. The scripting tests were not deleted: eight files used a JavaScript counter as instrumentation for the state snapshot and rollback machinery, which M2 does not touch, so the counter moved to the world-state engine and those tests still assert what they always did. Frontend lint and build are clean; the image builds, and its wheel-building stage is gone with quickjs. No M3 work. Undo is still destructive and there is still no Redo.	2026-09-02 11:27:14 -04:00