Files
interactive-story/Dockerfile
JesseMarkowitzandClaude Opus 5 c1a73b3d77 M1: make the first story turn work with no Internet
Phase 0B ran the upstream application on a network with no route out and
the first turn died in tiktoken, which downloads its BPE table the first
time anything counts a token. The browser separately fetched three font
families from Google on every page load. Neither is visible on a machine
that has been online once, which is why both now have tests.

The tokenizer table is vendored at
backend/app/context/vendor/cl100k_base.tiktoken and
backend/app/context/encoding.py builds the encoding from it directly,
verifying its SHA-256 against the digest tiktoken itself pins for that
URL. No code path in the tokenizer can reach the network any more —
not a warm cache, not an environment variable a deployment could forget.
The encoding was checked token for token against tiktoken's own.

The three font families are self-hosted as variable fonts under
frontend/public/fonts/ (343 KiB, Latin and Latin Extended), declared in
frontend/src/styles/fonts.css, and re-vendored by
frontend/tools/vendor_fonts.py. Their OFL licences ship beside them.
With no remote asset left, the CSP drops both Google hosts and gains
object-src, base-uri and form-action; woff2 also gets its real media
type, which Python's table lacks on a slim image.

A trusted-LAN Ollama turned out not to work at all over HTTPS. httpx
verifies against the certifi bundle, so an endpoint whose certificate
comes from a CA the user installed on their own machines — a StartOS
server's Ollama, for one — was refused with CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
while curl and the browser on the same host accepted it.
app/tlstrust.py builds one context that unions the platform CA store
with certifi's, and all four outbound clients use it. A union rather
than a swap, so an image with an empty system store cannot start failing
on endpoints that worked before. Verification itself is untouched:
CERT_REQUIRED, hostname checking on, and no insecure escape hatch.

The storyteller listener is now loopback by explicit statement rather
than by inheriting uvicorn's default: start.sh, start.ps1, and
docker-compose.yml, which publishes to 127.0.0.1 rather than every
interface. Reaching an Ollama on another machine is outbound and needs
none of that inbound exposure.

backend/requirements.lock pins the exact tested closure;
requirements.txt keeps the ranges. DEVELOPMENT.md covers setup, the
same-host and trusted-LAN Ollama configurations, and how to re-run the
offline proof. PROVENANCE.md records the upstream commit, the MIT terms,
and both vendored assets.

Verified, not just compiled. On an --internal Docker network with
1.1.1.1 unreachable and no name resolving, a campaign was created and
played for six turns through same-host Ollama, restarted, and resumed.
A second run played ten turns through Ollama on a separate physical
machine on the LAN over verified HTTPS, summaries and embeddings
included, with the storyteller's default route deleted so the LAN was
reachable and the Internet was not. Its capture: 893 packets to the
approved host, 730 loopback, zero anywhere else, and zero DNS queries.
Two induced model failures left the accepted story bit-identical. The
inherited SPA was opened in a browser and a campaign read back from it.
Evidence is in planning/reports/M1-BASELINE-REPORT.md, along with the
findings that did not belong in this change.

648 backend tests pass, up from the inherited 632; frontend lint and
build are clean; the image builds. No M2 work is included: the hosted,
cloud, analytics, Postgres and scripting surfaces are untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017foPNqFjAJa2Ngebf5mEfL
2026-09-02 02:40:28 -04:00

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2.2 KiB
Docker

# Stage 1 — build the React SPA. Node 24: package-lock.json is written by
# npm 11, which older bundled npms (node 22's 10.x) refuse as out-of-sync.
FROM node:24-alpine AS frontend-build
WORKDIR /build
COPY frontend/package.json frontend/package-lock.json ./
RUN npm ci
COPY frontend/ ./
RUN npm run build
# Stage 2 — build Python wheels (quickjs compiles from source if no wheel
# matches, so keep the toolchain out of the final image)
FROM python:3.12-slim AS python-build
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends gcc make \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY backend/requirements.txt /tmp/requirements.txt
RUN pip wheel --no-cache-dir -r /tmp/requirements.txt -w /wheels
# Stage 3 — runtime
FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=python-build /wheels /wheels
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir /wheels/* && rm -rf /wheels
# Layout mirrors the repo: main.py finds the SPA at ../../frontend/dist
# relative to backend/app/main.py.
COPY backend/app /app/backend/app
COPY --from=frontend-build /build/dist /app/frontend/dist
# Database lives on a volume; parent dir is created by the app if missing.
ENV AIDND_DB_PATH=/data/data.db
VOLUME /data
EXPOSE 8000
# Publish this port to loopback only — `-p 127.0.0.1:8000:8000`, which is what
# docker-compose.yml does. The listener below is 0.0.0.0 because that is the
# only address a published port can reach inside a container; it is not an
# invitation to put the storyteller on the LAN, which is single-user and
# unauthenticated in local mode.
WORKDIR /app/backend
# --proxy-headers lets uvicorn fix up the request scheme (https) behind the
# platform's edge. We deliberately do NOT pass --forwarded-allow-ips "*": that
# made uvicorn trust the LEFTMOST X-Forwarded-For value, which the client fully
# controls, so anyone could rotate the header to dodge the per-IP rate limits.
# The client IP used for rate limiting is derived in limits._client_ip from the
# hop the edge appends (rightmost), which a client cannot spoof past; tune with
# AIDND_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS if the platform adds more proxy hops.
# Single worker on purpose: the turn lock, rate limiter, and debug log are
# in-process state.
CMD ["uvicorn", "app.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8000", \
"--proxy-headers"]