The release-validation milestone, and the thing it had to settle first was whether any of the earlier evidence meant what it said. M8 measured a deployment enforcing a 4,096-token input window while the application budgeted 16,384. Every request returned 200. What Ollama does with the excess is drop the oldest tokens, and the oldest tokens here are the system block — the narrator's rules and the campaign canon. A hundred-turn certification against that server would have looked perfect and proved nothing, which is why this milestone could not begin with a hundred turns. So the application asks now. Ollama's window is a property of how a model was loaded rather than of the request — sending num_ctx is accepted, ignored, and worse, reloads the model at the server's own default — so the only honest move is to find out and then tell the truth about it. /api/ps reports what a resident model is being served with, /api/show what an unloaded one will load with, both on the same host inference already uses, through the same endpoint policy and the same TLS trust store. A verified window is a ceiling on the budget; an unverified one leaves the budget alone and is recorded as unverified in the turn's own provenance, so an old turn can be asked afterwards whether it was built against a checked window. There is no third behaviour, and in particular no hard-coded 4,096: a number the server did not say would be right on one machine and wrong on the next. The proof that this is doing something is a campaign whose canon sits at the front of the prompt, 120 turns of history, and a 4,096-token window. The canon is still there afterwards and the oldest history is gone. The same campaign built the old way produces a prompt more than twice the window — the defect, reproduced, so the fix is measured against it rather than asserted. Two defects the validation found on its own, and they are the same defect twice: something was true and nobody was told. A manual state correction of four changes with one bad reference applied three, returned 201, and said nothing — while recording the refusal on the audit row nobody reads. It came to light because the identity diagnostic's own fixture was refused that way and the whole run proceeded on a campaign with no scene, which would have read as a model failure. And the narration-length setting moved no number: brief, medium and long each became one English sentence, while the numeric hint the model actually reads was derived from the global reply cap and said the same thing for all three. Both now say what they did. The other two post-M8 findings are closed as well. The tab said AI D&D, which no document had ever claimed it did not; it says Interactive Story now, with the open campaign first, and the name is the owner's decision rather than a find-and-replace to something narrower than the engine. After an Undo the reader could not tell where they had landed; the control row now ends with "Moment 11 · later story ahead", from the server's own answer, in the word the transcript already uses, with none of head, branch or depth anywhere near it. The identity diagnostic exists and the root cause does not. That campaign was destroyed, so no cause can be established — what M11 owes the finding is something that can classify the next occurrence, and a diagnostic that makes only the judgements a program can honestly make: duplicate keys, shared names, protagonist drift, state and context disagreeing. Whether prose misattributed a line is left to a person reading it beside its prompt, because a regex cannot read dialogue and one that pretended to would produce exactly the confident wrong answer this finding is about. Its detectors are proved to fire against a planted second Alice. Two entities may still share a display name. That was checked first, as the finding asked, and left permitted: a mother and a daughter, or a stranger giving a false name, are ordinary fiction, and refusing them to guard against a model mistake would refuse the wrong thing. What was missing was that it happened silently. It is reported now. Evidence, not inference: a hundred accepted turns against a real narrator with genuine process restarts; a real browser against the built SPA; a container with no network at all; a campaign moved into a data directory that never existed. Each was discarded and re-run whenever the product changed under it, and the runs that were thrown away are listed in the report with the reason, along with ten defects in the harnesses themselves — because a harness that has only ever agreed with itself is not evidence, and two of M8's five harness defects were masking real ones. No dependency was added, removed or upgraded. No acceptance test was retired, relaxed or reclassified. M11 is implemented and verified; it is not accepted, and there is no release tag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Qyn3oRd4D6pi72nKBG725B
249 lines
10 KiB
Python
249 lines
10 KiB
Python
"""M11: what the inference server will *actually* accept, as opposed to what we budgeted.
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M8 found the failure this module exists to prevent. The application budgets a
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prompt up to `Settings.context_token_budget` — 16,384 by default — while Ollama
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enforces a window of its own, and on a machine with no VRAM that window defaults
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to **4,096**. The request still returns HTTP 200. Nothing warns anybody. What
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actually happens is worse than an error: `llama.cpp` drops the **oldest** tokens,
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and the oldest tokens in this application are the system block — the narrator
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rules and the campaign canon. The symptom is a narrator that forgets canon deep
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into a long session, with nothing on screen explaining why, and every acceptance
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test that reads a returned 200 as success passing throughout.
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The invariant M11 requires:
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The application must not silently budget more narrator input
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than the configured Ollama runtime will actually accept.
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Note the word *silently*. There are two honest outcomes and this module produces
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both: either the window is **verified**, in which case the budget is capped to it
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so the prompt physically cannot overflow; or it is **unverified**, in which case
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the assembly says so, in the context report, on the connection test, and in the
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turn's stored provenance. What must not happen is the third thing — assembling
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16,384 tokens against a 4,096-token server and calling the result a turn.
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## Why this is not solved by sending `num_ctx`
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It was tried, and it is documented in `DEVELOPMENT.md`. Ollama's
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OpenAI-compatible endpoint accepts `num_ctx` — nested in `options` or at the top
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level — returns 200, and ignores it. Worse, it reloads the model at its own
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default, so priming the server through the native API first does not help
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either: the next request resets the window. The window is a property of how the
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model is loaded, not of the request, so the only things that change it are a
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model with `num_ctx` baked in (`/api/create`) or `OLLAMA_CONTEXT_LENGTH` on the
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server. Both are operator actions. This module's job is not to change the
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window; it is to find out what it is and refuse to lie about it.
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## How the window is found
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Ollama's native API sits beside the OpenAI-compatible one on the same host, so
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this asks the server the application is already talking to, and nothing else. No
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new destination, the same endpoint policy, the same TLS trust store.
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/api/ps a loaded model reports `context_length`: the window the runtime
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is enforcing *right now*. This is the truth when it is available.
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/api/show an unloaded model may carry `num_ctx` in its baked parameters,
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which is the window it will load with; `model_info` carries the
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architecture's own ceiling, which caps everything else.
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`/api/ps` is asked first because a model that is loaded has already settled the
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question. `/api/show` answers it for a model that is not loaded yet, which is the
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ordinary case at the start of a session.
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## What it deliberately does not do
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It does not hard-code 4,096, which would cripple a correctly configured
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deployment; it does not raise the budget, which is the operator's decision; it
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does not fall back to a cloud probe, a bundled table of model sizes, or a guess
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from the model's name. An unknown window is reported as unknown.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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import re
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import time
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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import httpx
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from . import endpoints, tlstrust
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log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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#: Short, because this sits in the turn path. A server that does not answer in
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#: two seconds has told us what we need to know: we cannot verify the window
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#: right now, and the turn should proceed unverified rather than stall.
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PROBE_TIMEOUT = 2.0
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CONNECT_TIMEOUT = 1.5
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#: A verified window is stable — it changes when an operator reloads a model —
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#: so it is worth keeping. A failure is cached too, and for much less time,
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#: because the commonest cause is a server that is starting up.
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POSITIVE_TTL = 600.0
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NEGATIVE_TTL = 60.0
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#: Sources, in the order of how much they prove.
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LOADED = "loaded" # /api/ps: what the runtime is enforcing now
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PARAMETERS = "parameters" # /api/show: what the model will load with
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UNKNOWN = "unknown"
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class Window:
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"""What was learned about the server's input window, and how."""
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#: The total context in tokens — input *and* output share it — or None when
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#: it could not be determined.
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tokens: int | None
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#: One of LOADED, PARAMETERS, UNKNOWN.
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source: str
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#: The architecture's own ceiling, when the server reported one. Useful to a
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#: reader deciding whether raising the window is even possible.
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model_max: int | None = None
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#: Why the window is unknown, or how it was found. Shown to the user.
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detail: str = ""
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@property
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def verified(self) -> bool:
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return self.tokens is not None
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UNVERIFIED = Window(tokens=None, source=UNKNOWN, detail="not checked")
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_cache: dict[tuple[str, str], tuple[float, Window]] = {}
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def native_base(endpoint_url: str) -> str:
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"""The Ollama-native base beside an OpenAI-compatible endpoint.
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`https://host:1234/v1` -> `https://host:1234`. Anything else is used as
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given, because an endpoint that is not shaped like Ollama's is one this
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cannot interrogate and should not guess about.
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"""
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trimmed = (endpoint_url or "").rstrip("/")
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return re.sub(r"/v1$", "", trimmed)
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def effective_budget(configured: int, window: Window | int | None) -> int:
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"""The budget the prompt may actually use.
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The whole enforcement, in one line: a verified window is a ceiling. The
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configured budget still wins when it is *smaller*, because a reader who has
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deliberately asked for a shorter prompt should get one.
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"""
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tokens = window.tokens if isinstance(window, Window) else window
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if tokens is None or tokens <= 0:
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return configured
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return min(configured, tokens)
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def cache_clear() -> None:
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"""Forgets what was learned. Called when the endpoint or model changes."""
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_cache.clear()
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async def probe(endpoint_url: str, model: str, *, use_cache: bool = True) -> Window:
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"""Asks the server what window `model` gets. Never raises.
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Returns `UNVERIFIED` for every failure — refused endpoint, unreachable
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server, TLS failure, a non-Ollama endpoint, an unparseable answer. The caller
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cannot act differently on those and the reader is told the same thing either
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way: the window could not be checked.
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"""
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if not endpoint_url or not model:
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return Window(None, UNKNOWN, detail="no endpoint or model configured")
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key = (endpoint_url, model)
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now = time.monotonic()
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if use_cache:
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hit = _cache.get(key)
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if hit is not None and hit[0] > now:
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return hit[1]
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window = await _ask(endpoint_url, model)
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ttl = POSITIVE_TTL if window.verified else NEGATIVE_TTL
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_cache[key] = (now + ttl, window)
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return window
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async def _ask(endpoint_url: str, model: str) -> Window:
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# The same policy the turn itself is held to. A window probe must not be a
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# way to reach an address inference may not (ADR 011, H12).
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reason = endpoints.rejection_reason(endpoint_url)
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if reason is not None:
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return Window(None, UNKNOWN, detail=f"endpoint not allowed — {reason}")
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base = native_base(endpoint_url)
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try:
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(
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timeout=httpx.Timeout(PROBE_TIMEOUT, connect=CONNECT_TIMEOUT),
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verify=tlstrust.ssl_context(),
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) as client:
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loaded = await _loaded_window(client, base, model)
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if loaded is not None:
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tokens, ceiling = loaded
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return Window(
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tokens, LOADED, ceiling,
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f"{tokens:,} tokens, reported by the running model",
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)
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return await _declared_window(client, base, model)
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except (httpx.HTTPError, ValueError, TypeError, KeyError) as exc:
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log.debug("context window probe failed for %s: %s", base, exc)
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return Window(None, UNKNOWN, detail=f"could not ask the server ({type(exc).__name__})")
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async def _loaded_window(client, base: str, model: str):
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"""`/api/ps`: the window a resident model is actually being served with."""
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resp = await client.get(f"{base}/api/ps")
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if resp.status_code != 200:
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return None
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for entry in (resp.json() or {}).get("models") or []:
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if entry.get("name") == model or entry.get("model") == model:
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tokens = entry.get("context_length")
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if isinstance(tokens, int) and tokens > 0:
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return tokens, None
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return None
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async def _declared_window(client, base: str, model: str) -> Window:
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"""`/api/show`: what the model will load with, and its architectural cap."""
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resp = await client.post(f"{base}/api/show", json={"model": model})
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if resp.status_code != 200:
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return Window(
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None, UNKNOWN,
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detail=f"the server did not describe the model (HTTP {resp.status_code})",
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)
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body = resp.json() or {}
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ceiling = _architecture_ceiling(body.get("model_info") or {})
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declared = _num_ctx(body.get("parameters"))
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if declared is None:
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return Window(
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None, UNKNOWN, ceiling,
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detail=(
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"the model sets no num_ctx, so the server will load it at its own "
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"default — which is 4,096 where there is no VRAM"
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),
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)
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tokens = min(declared, ceiling) if ceiling else declared
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return Window(
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tokens, PARAMETERS, ceiling,
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f"{tokens:,} tokens, from the model's own num_ctx",
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)
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def _num_ctx(parameters) -> int | None:
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"""Reads `num_ctx` out of the plain-text parameter block Ollama returns."""
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if not isinstance(parameters, str):
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return None
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match = re.search(r"^\s*num_ctx\s+(\d+)\s*$", parameters, re.MULTILINE)
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return int(match.group(1)) if match else None
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def _architecture_ceiling(model_info: dict) -> int | None:
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"""`<arch>.context_length` — the largest window this model can have."""
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for key, value in model_info.items():
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if key.endswith(".context_length") and isinstance(value, int) and value > 0:
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return value
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return None
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