Files
interactive-story/DEVELOPMENT.md
JesseMarkowitz 8c65ae99de M2: cut the hosted product away from the local one
94 files, +1,395 -6,578. Three files are new; twenty-four are gone. The
milestone is subtraction, and what is left is the single-user local
storyteller the specification describes.

Removed in full: campaign scripting and its QuickJS sandbox; multi-user
accounts, guest sessions, login, registration and the shared demo key;
the visitor-analytics tables, dashboard and page beacon; the access log
of sign-ins, addresses and devices; per-IP and per-user rate limiting
and quotas; Render deployment config; Postgres and psycopg; cloud
inference providers, the API-key field and the key encryption that
existed to store it; session-cookie signing. None of it was hidden
behind a flag — the routes are gone and answer 404.

Two things were kept that the brief allowed keeping. The `users` table
and its foreign keys stay as an internal ownership detail, because
rewriting them out means a migration across most of the schema to
delete a column that costs nothing; nothing creates a second user and
no request carries an identity. Five inert tables and four inert
columns stay for the same reason, so an M1 campaign database opens
unchanged.

The one addition is app/endpoints.py, which decides where a story may
be sent. Loopback, RFC1918, link-local, unique-local and CGNAT — an
explicit allowlist of networks, not a guess at what `ipaddress` means
by "private", which calls the documentation ranges private and IPv6
loopback reserved. Every address a hostname resolves to must be in it,
so a split answer does not squeak through, and the rule runs both when
the endpoint is saved and before every outbound request, because a name
that resolved to the LAN this morning can resolve elsewhere this
afternoon. Known cloud hosts are named in the refusal so the error says
why rather than looking like broken DNS. TLS is never traded against
it: M1's shared trust context is intact on all four clients and there
is no way to skip verification.

The hardcoded 120-second model timeout is now a setting. That was not
theoretical — on this GPU-less four-core host a cold load of
qwen2.5:3b-instruct took 648.9 seconds to produce the first turn, while
turns 2 to 5 of the same campaign took 3.6 to 13.1. Connect stays short
at 10s so a wrong address still fails fast; the read timeout defaults
to 300s and is bounded at 3600, because "wait longer" must stay a
number.

Two defects found while testing and fixed here. An unknown /api path
fell through the SPA catch-all and came back as HTML with status 200,
so a client asking for JSON parsed a web page instead of learning the
route was gone. And AIDND_CORS_ORIGINS accepted "*", which on an
unauthenticated loopback API would hand every page on the Internet a
write handle on the campaign database; it now refuses to start.

Verified rather than assumed. Offline, on a network with no route out
and no DNS: five turns, retry with both takes retained, restart with an
identical transcript digest, a failed model call leaving the accepted
AI-turn count untouched, and a capture with zero non-loopback unicast
packets. Against a real second machine on the LAN over HTTPS with a
private CA: four turns, restart, and a capture showing 289 packets to
the approved host, 344 loopback, zero anywhere else, zero DNS queries.
Cloud and public endpoints refused with their reasons; no API key
settable; every removed route 404.

604 backend tests pass, down from 648 by the fifteen retired with the
subsystems they tested and up by the twenty-nine added for the endpoint
policy and the removed surface. The scripting tests were not deleted:
eight files used a JavaScript counter as instrumentation for the state
snapshot and rollback machinery, which M2 does not touch, so the
counter moved to the world-state engine and those tests still assert
what they always did. Frontend lint and build are clean; the image
builds, and its wheel-building stage is gone with quickjs.

No M3 work. Undo is still destructive and there is still no Redo.
2026-09-02 11:27:14 -04:00

287 lines
11 KiB
Markdown

# Development and local operation
This is the Adventure Storyteller production fork of AI-DnD. `PROVENANCE.md`
records where the code came from; `planning/` holds the product specification
and milestone plan.
Everything here assumes the local-only rule from
`planning/DECISIONS/004-local-only-production.md`: after setup, ordinary story
play must work with **no Internet access at all**. Setup itself downloads
dependencies and models; playing does not.
## Versions this was built and tested on
| | |
| --- | --- |
| OS | Linux (Ubuntu 24.04 userland), x86-64, 4 cores, 15 GB RAM, no GPU |
| Python | 3.12.3 |
| Node | 22.23.1, npm 10.9.8 (the Dockerfile builds the SPA on Node 24) |
| Ollama | `ollama/ollama:latest` in Docker |
| Models | `qwen2.5:3b-instruct` (narrator), `nomic-embed-text` (memory bank) |
## Setup
```bash
# Backend, from the exact tested dependency closure.
python3 -m venv backend/.venv
backend/.venv/bin/pip install -r backend/requirements.lock
# Frontend.
cd frontend && npm ci && cd ..
```
`backend/requirements.lock` pins every version, transitive ones included.
`backend/requirements.txt` states the ranges the code actually needs and stays
the file you edit; regenerate the lock after a deliberate upgrade (the header in
the lock says how).
This is the only step that needs the Internet. It downloads Python and npm
packages; it does **not** download a tokenizer or a font, because both are
vendored in the tree — see "What was made offline-safe" below.
You also need the models, once:
```bash
ollama pull qwen2.5:3b-instruct
ollama pull nomic-embed-text # only if you want the memory bank
```
There is no account to create and nothing to log in to. The application is
single-user: whoever can reach it on loopback is its owner.
## Running
**Development** — backend on `:8000`, Vite dev server on `:5173`:
```bash
./start.sh
```
**Production-shaped** — one server, SPA served by FastAPI:
```bash
cd frontend && npm run build && cd ..
cd backend && .venv/bin/uvicorn app.main:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
```
Then open <http://127.0.0.1:8000>.
**Docker**:
```bash
docker compose up --build
```
### The listener is loopback, and stays loopback
`start.sh`, `start.ps1` and the production command above all pass
`--host 127.0.0.1` explicitly. `docker-compose.yml` publishes
`127.0.0.1:8000:8000` — the process inside the container listens on `0.0.0.0`
because a published port cannot reach anything else, but the port is only
bound on the host's loopback.
That is a requirement, not a preference. In local mode the storyteller API is
single-user and unauthenticated: anything that can reach it can read and
rewrite every campaign. Putting Ollama on another machine (below) does **not**
change this — it is an outbound connection and needs no inbound exposure.
If you publish the port to `0.0.0.0` anyway, you have made a deliberate
decision that this project's threat model does not cover
(`planning/SECURITY-THREAT-MODEL.md`).
## Pointing the storyteller at Ollama
The endpoint, model and (unused) API key are **runtime settings stored in the
database**, not environment variables. Set them on the app's Settings page, or
with one request:
```bash
curl -X PUT http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/settings \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"endpoint_url":"http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1","model":"qwen2.5:3b-instruct",
"api_mode":"chat","api_key":"","max_output_tokens":200,
"context_token_budget":4096}'
```
`POST /api/settings/test` (the **Test connection** button) returns
`{"ok": true, "models": [...]}` and is the fastest way to tell a wrong endpoint
from a missing model. When it fails it says which kind of failure it was, and
they need different things done about them:
| `kind` | What it means |
| --- | --- |
| `rejected` | The endpoint is outside the policy below. Not a network problem. |
| `unreachable` | Nothing answered. Ollama is not running there, or the port is wrong. |
| `tls` | The certificate did not verify — install the CA (see below). |
| `timeout` | It accepted the connection and then said nothing. |
| `http` | It answered with an error status; the body is included. |
A successful test also warns when the endpoint is reachable but has no model by
the configured name, which is the commonest way for a correct endpoint to still
fail every turn.
### Which endpoints are allowed
`backend/app/endpoints.py` decides, and it is deliberately narrow: **loopback,
your own LAN, or nothing.** The allowed networks are `127.0.0.0/8`, the three
RFC1918 ranges, link-local, IPv6 loopback and unique-local, and `100.64.0.0/10`
(carrier-grade NAT, which is what a mesh VPN such as Tailscale hands out).
Every address the endpoint's hostname resolves to must be in one of them. A
public address is refused, a name resolving to both a private and a public
address is refused, and known cloud inference hosts are refused by name so the
error says why rather than looking like a DNS fault.
The rule is applied when you save the endpoint *and* again before every
outbound request, so a database edited by hand or a hostname that starts
resolving somewhere new cannot turn a local install into an exfiltration path.
There is no setting to relax it.
### Same host (the default)
```text
endpoint_url = http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1
```
Nothing else to do. Ollama's own default is to listen on loopback.
### An Ollama on another machine on your trusted LAN
Supported and explicitly configured — never guessed, never discovered.
On the **inference machine**, tell Ollama to accept connections from the LAN,
because it binds loopback by default:
```bash
OLLAMA_HOST=0.0.0.0:11434 ollama serve
```
On the **storyteller machine**, set the endpoint to that host's address:
```text
endpoint_url = http://192.168.1.50:11434/v1
```
Use an IP address or a name your own network resolves. Then:
- the storyteller UI/API stays on `127.0.0.1` — do not change the listener;
- prompts, story text, retrieved memories and embedding inputs all travel to
that host, so it has to be one you control, on a network you trust;
- the inference machine needs the models installed, not the storyteller;
- no Internet is involved in either direction.
A LAN endpoint is accepted because it is on one of the allowed networks above.
Nothing else about it is special.
#### If that endpoint is HTTPS with your own CA
Some inference hosts are only reachable over TLS. A StartOS server is one: it
serves Ollama over HTTPS with a certificate from its own local CA, and plain
HTTP redirects to it.
Install that CA on the machine running the storyteller, the same way you would
for the browser — on Debian and Ubuntu:
```bash
sudo cp your-ca.crt /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/
sudo update-ca-certificates
```
then use the `https://` URL and the hostname the certificate is issued for:
```text
endpoint_url = https://inference.lan:8443/v1
```
The application verifies against the machine's CA store **and** the `certifi`
bundle (`backend/app/tlstrust.py`), so a CA you installed at the OS level is
honoured, exactly as `curl` and your browser honour it. Public certificates
keep working unchanged.
There is deliberately **no** setting to skip verification. If a connection is
refused with `CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED`, the CA is not installed where the
storyteller can see it, or the URL's hostname does not match the certificate —
`openssl s_client -connect host:port` will say which. In a container, remember
the CA has to be inside the image or bind-mounted; the host's store is not
visible from within.
## Tests
```bash
cd backend && .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q # 604 tests
cd frontend && npm run lint && npm run build
```
Two files are the M1 regression guards.
`test_offline_assets.py` fails if the tokenizer starts fetching its table
again, if a remote font or stylesheet comes back, or if the CSP names a remote
origin. Two of its checks read the built SPA under `frontend/dist/` and skip
when it has not been built, so run `npm run build` before treating a green
suite as complete evidence.
`test_tls_trust.py` fails if outbound verification is weakened, if a public CA
is lost from the union, or if a new HTTP client is added without the shared
verification context.
M2 added two more. `test_endpoint_policy.py` fails if the set of reachable
addresses widens, or if either place the rule is applied stops applying it —
it resolves hostnames through a stub, so it tests the policy rather than
whatever DNS the machine has. `test_local_only_surface.py` fails if a removed
subsystem comes back as a route, if an API key becomes settable again, if the
model timeout stops being configurable or becomes unbounded, or if a supported
start path stops binding loopback.
## What was made offline-safe, and how to check
Two runtime downloads were removed in Milestone M1. Both were invisible on a
machine that had been online once, which is exactly why they need tests.
**The tokenizer.** `tiktoken.get_encoding("cl100k_base")` downloads a 1.7 MB
BPE table on first use, and the context builder counts tokens on every turn, so
the first story turn on an air-gapped install died with a `ConnectionError`.
The table is vendored at `backend/app/context/vendor/cl100k_base.tiktoken` and
`backend/app/context/encoding.py` builds the encoding from it, verifying its
SHA-256 against the digest `tiktoken` itself pins.
**The fonts.** The SPA linked `fonts.googleapis.com` from `index.html`, so
every page load fetched a stylesheet and font files from Google. The three
families are self-hosted under `frontend/public/fonts/`, declared in
`frontend/src/styles/fonts.css`, and re-vendored by
`python3 frontend/tools/vendor_fonts.py`. The CSP in `backend/app/main.py` now
names no remote origin at all.
To convince yourself on a machine that has already been online, run the app
with no route out rather than trusting a cold cache:
```bash
docker network create --internal offline
docker run -d --name ollama --network offline -v ollama-models:/root/.ollama ollama/ollama
docker build -t storyteller .
# The app shares Ollama's network namespace, so Ollama is on its loopback and
# neither has a route to the Internet.
docker run -d --name app --network container:ollama -v story-data:/data \
storyteller uvicorn app.main:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
docker exec app python -c "import socket; socket.create_connection(('1.1.1.1',443),timeout=4)"
# -> OSError: Network is unreachable, and story turns still work
```
`planning/reports/M1-BASELINE-REPORT.md` records the run this procedure is
taken from, including the packet captures.
## Things inherited from upstream that M1 deliberately did not touch
These are M2's scope (`planning/BUILD-MILESTONES.md`), listed here so nobody
reports them as new:
- hosted/multi-user/account/demo-key code, analytics tables, Postgres and
Render deployment paths, and the OpenRouter default endpoint constant all
still exist in the tree. None of them is reachable from a default local run,
and none requires a cloud service.
- `docs/*.html` is upstream's GitHub Pages project site and still links Google
Fonts. It is not served by the application and is not part of any build.
- `.github/workflows/ci.yml` is upstream's GitHub Actions pipeline. This
repository lives on a self-hosted Gitea; the workflow is kept for provenance
and is not what runs the tests here.
- QuickJS campaign scripting is still present and still tested.