JesseMarkowitzandClaude Opus 5
2fdd2547f0
M2's review reported six planning recommendations rather than applying them, three marked before M3. All six are applied here, plus three additions drawn from the same evidence. No implementation file is touched. The endpoint policy was the gap that mattered. It is the most consequential setting in the application — the storyteller sends the player's prose, the context, the memories and the embedding inputs to whatever address it names — and it existed only as a module docstring. It is now ADR 011 and a new §10A in the threat model, which also retires the assumption in §71A that the inherited guard was a starting point. It was not: AI-DnD's SSRF guard blocked private addresses to stop a hosted server reaching its own internal network, which is the exact opposite of what a local storyteller needs. It was removed, not adapted. Both documents state the rule as implemented — an allowlist of explicit local-network CIDRs, every resolved address checked, enforced on save and again before every outbound request, TLS never traded against it — and both state the two residual limits plainly rather than implying they are covered: a hostile host already on the trusted LAN is inside the permitted boundary, and a rebinding interval exists between the policy's resolution and the client's connection. Accepted risks, not M3 work. The CIDRs are spelled out rather than derived from is_private/is_reserved, and the ADR records why: is_private is true of the documentation ranges and 0.0.0.0/8, and is_reserved is true of IPv6 loopback, so a rule built on it refuses an ordinary same-host Ollama on [::1]. TECHNICAL-DESIGN §5.1 items 3 and 4 are marked done, closing all five hardening items. A new §5.2 records the M1/M2 architecture as fact rather than intention, so later milestones inherit what the code does. A new §18.1 carries the lesson of M2's two regressions: when removing a setting, test a real consumer construction path; when adding one, prove it reaches the component that uses it. Both defects hid behind a green suite because the tests at that boundary were mocks. BUILD-MILESTONES records M2 complete, with the capabilities later milestones inherit and the debt carried forward. Two notes go to milestones that would otherwise misread what M2 left them. M5 is told that eight rollback tests now use the world-state engine as instrumentation and not as endorsement — the instrumentation moves when the protocol does, and those tests are reworked rather than deleted. M6 is told that the memory bank died silently under a green suite, so background failure must be observable and at least one real provider-construction path must be tested. The security contract gains what M2 demonstrated. H10 now names the two conditions that were defects during M2: a wildcard origin must be refused at startup, and an unknown /api path must 404 rather than returning the SPA with 200. New H12 covers endpoint enforcement, and its fourth pass condition is the one that matters — a public endpoint written into the database behind the settings API must still be refused at the wire. A build passing the first three and failing that one has configuration validation only. SPECIFICATION.md is deliberately unchanged. M2 altered no product requirement; it removed capability the specification never asked for. The two M2 reports gain appended closeout notes rather than edits. Their original wording about an uncommitted working tree was true when written, and the note records what happened afterwards: the six-file correction is8652fe7,8c65ae9remains the implementation commit, and the two were never squashed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HsZBU8sWRuYTyLgWsu2oQ6
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# Planning Package Version
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**Package:** Adventure Storyteller Planning Package v2.2
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**Revision date:** 2026-09-03
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**Status:** Phase 0 complete; architecture selected; **Milestones M1 and M2 implemented and accepted**; M3 not yet briefed.
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## v2.2 — Post-M2 Closeout (2026-09-03)
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M2 removed the hosted, cloud, account and scripting surface and added the
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inference endpoint policy. Its review recommended six planning changes and
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reported rather than applied them; all six are applied in this revision, listed
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in `README.md` § *Post-M2 corrections applied*, with the evidence in
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`reports/M2-BASELINE-REPORT.md` and `reports/M2-IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md`.
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In summary:
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- the **inference endpoint policy is recorded as implemented** — an address
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allowlist of explicit local-network CIDRs, every resolved address checked,
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enforced when settings are saved and again before every outbound request, with
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TLS verification never traded against it (new **ADR 011**,
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`SECURITY-THREAT-MODEL.md` §10A),
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- its two **residual limits are stated rather than mitigated**: a hostile host
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already on the trusted LAN, and the DNS-rebinding interval between the
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policy's resolution and the client's connection,
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- `TECHNICAL-DESIGN.md` §5.1 items 3 and 4 are **resolved**, and a new §5.2
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records the M1/M2 production architecture as fact,
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- a **wiring rule** is added (§18.1): removing a setting requires testing a real
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consumer path, and adding one requires proving it reaches its component — M2
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shipped two defects behind a 604-test green suite because the tests at that
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boundary were mocks,
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- `BUILD-MILESTONES.md` records **M2 complete**, warns M5 that eight rollback
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tests use the world-state engine as instrumentation rather than as
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architecture, and requires M6 to make background memory failure observable,
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- the security acceptance contract is strengthened: **H10** now names the
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wildcard-origin and `/api` 404 conditions, and new **H12** covers inference
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endpoint enforcement including the database-edited-behind-the-API case.
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`SPECIFICATION.md` is unchanged: M2 altered no product requirement. Nothing in
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the architecture selected in v2 was reversed.
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## v2.1 — Post-M1 Corrections (2026-09-02)
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M1 implementation evidence contradicted or under-specified parts of v2. The
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corrections are recorded in the documents themselves and listed in
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`README.md` § *Post-M1 corrections applied*; the evidence behind them is in
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`reports/M1-BASELINE-REPORT.md` and `reports/M1-IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md`.
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In summary:
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- a trusted-LAN Ollama may be **HTTPS with a privately issued certificate**;
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clients verify against the operating system's CA store, with full certificate
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and hostname verification and no bypass option (ADR 002,
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`TECHNICAL-DESIGN.md` §5, A06),
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- offline claims require a **fresh cache and no route out** to be evidence at
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all, and vendored runtime artifacts should be integrity-verifiable
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(ADR 004),
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- A05's invariant is about **accepted** history; the user's submitted text is
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deliberately retained on a failed turn,
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- A06 requires a **real second machine and an HTTPS endpoint**; a plain-HTTP
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LAN test is no longer sufficient evidence,
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- the standard test environment records **CPU/GPU/RAM**, because cold model
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load on a CPU-only host exceeded the inherited 120 s client timeout,
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- `BUILD-MILESTONES.md` records M1 as complete and reframes M2's endpoint work
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as **narrowing** an existing capability rather than inventing it,
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- `SECURITY-THREAT-MODEL.md` §53 distinguishes **inbound** TLS (still deferred)
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from **outbound** certificate verification (required, done in M1).
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Nothing in the architecture selected in v2 was reversed.
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## v2 — Post Phase 0B Revision (2026-09-01)
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This v2 package supersedes the earlier planning package produced before the final Phase 0B review and the trusted-LAN Ollama deployment clarification.
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Key v2 changes include:
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- AI-DnD selected as the production base at the pinned Phase 0B commit.
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- Non-destructive head-cursor Undo/Redo design selected.
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- Explicit typed/absolute narrative-state events selected for production state handling.
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- Imported knowledge separated from AI-DnD Story Cards.
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- Trusted-LAN Ollama inference supported in v1 while the storyteller UI/API remains loopback-bound by default.
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- Offline first-use dependencies and runtime remote assets identified as M1 hardening work.
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- Production implementation divided into milestones M1-M11.
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Historical Phase 0 prompts/reports are retained as evidence and should not be treated as current implementation instructions unless a current milestone prompt explicitly refers to them.
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