Closes M4. The review's three findings are fixed, the durability rule the specification always implied is now enforced, and M3's and M4's browser behaviour has been verified in a real browser for the first time. B-1 -- the Save Point list was an N+1 that loaded whole Action rows, narration included, to answer "does a row exist here". It is now one bulk two-column coordinate query plus one lineage: 53 SELECTs for 25 Save Points became 5, and the count no longer grows with the list. The clause is an OR of exact (branch, depth) pairs rather than two IN lists, because the cross product would report a Save Point resolved on the strength of another one's depth existing on this one's branch. A test builds exactly that trap. B-2 -- reclassified during closeout from "missing warning" to a behaviour defect, and fixed as one. STORY-BRANCH-SEMANTICS §19 says a named checkpoint remains until explicitly deleted, and §28 already required future cleanup to retain checkpoint-referenced paths; a cascade that silently removed Save Points with a branch violated both, and a warning would only have documented the violation. A branch a Save Point names can no longer be deleted. The request is refused with the offending Save Points named, the user deletes them explicitly -- which deletes no story -- and the branch then goes. The scope is the subtree, because deleting a branch takes its descendants. Both delete controls disable and explain. Recorded as a new §19.1; models.py, TECHNICAL-DESIGN §8.8 and DATA-MODEL §8 had all recorded the cascade as the rule and now record the refusal. An earlier pass in this same closeout had kept the cascade and added a warning. That was the wrong fix and its tests were replaced rather than left standing, since they pinned the defect. B-3 -- the D11/L03 automation never left one process, so it could not distinguish durable state from a live Python object. It now spawns real server processes, kills the first, and reads the campaign back with the second. C-5 -- creating a Save Point takes the campaign's turn lock. "Save where I am" has to name one committed position, and the head is what a turn in flight is about to move. Rename and Delete deliberately do not take it. The architecture is untouched: a Save Point is still name + note + (branch, depth), and restore is still coordinate -> head.move_to_node -> head.move_to -> attempts.restore_state. No second restore path, no state copied into a checkpoint, no fork on restore. Browser verification -- the first in this project, and it covers both milestones. Firefox 154.0.1 through geckodriver over the W3C WebDriver protocol, driving the rendered DOM: 47/47 checks, twice, on independent databases, no console errors. M3's Undo/Redo enable states, transcript movement, Retry and the take pager, divergence retiring Redo; M4's whole Save Point lifecycle, both confirmations, and the new branch-delete refusal including its recovery. No dependency was added: the WebDriver client is stdlib HTTP. No application defect was found by the browser. Four failures occurred, all in the harness -- a wrong SPA route, a wait comparing transcript length when the empty-story placeholder is longer than the first turn, a fixture deleting the branch it was reading, and a reload assertion that sampled once instead of waiting. The last was checked against the app before being called a harness bug. Tests: 698 backend pass (was 680), 60 M4, 94 M3 history, 66 export/ migrations, 93 security/local-only. Frontend lint and build clean, Docker build clean, loopback binding unchanged. No assertion weakened, no skip added. Planning: STORY-BRANCH-SEMANTICS §19.1 is the only behavioural change and it strengthens §19. V1-ACCEPTANCE-TESTS records D11-D14, I04, L03 and the E-series, keeping automated, live-runtime and browser evidence distinct, and weakens no pass condition. DATA-MODEL records the coordinate with the retry measurement that settles it. BROWSER-UX-SPEC rules for Moment over Turn. BUILD-MILESTONES marks M4 COMPLETE, closes M3's browser condition, and lists what M5 inherits. VERSION adds v2.6. No new ADR: ADR 005 already decides that history is preserved rather than overwritten, and §19.1 is that decision applied to checkpoint-referenced history. M4 is closed. M5 may now be briefed; it has not been started. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PWU4gTfLYY6Qq9U7aa9Qw2
302 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
302 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# Development and local operation
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This is the Adventure Storyteller production fork of AI-DnD. `PROVENANCE.md`
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records where the code came from; `planning/` holds the product specification
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and milestone plan.
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Everything here assumes the local-only rule from
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`planning/DECISIONS/004-local-only-production.md`: after setup, ordinary story
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play must work with **no Internet access at all**. Setup itself downloads
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dependencies and models; playing does not.
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## Versions this was built and tested on
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| --- | --- |
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| OS | Linux (Ubuntu 24.04 userland), x86-64, 4 cores, 15 GB RAM, no GPU |
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| Python | 3.12.3 |
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| Node | 22.23.1, npm 10.9.8 (the Dockerfile builds the SPA on Node 24) |
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| Ollama | `ollama/ollama:latest` in Docker |
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| Models | `qwen2.5:3b-instruct` (narrator), `nomic-embed-text` (memory bank) |
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## Setup
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```bash
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# Backend, from the exact tested dependency closure.
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python3 -m venv backend/.venv
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backend/.venv/bin/pip install -r backend/requirements.lock
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# Frontend.
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cd frontend && npm ci && cd ..
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```
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`backend/requirements.lock` pins every version, transitive ones included.
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`backend/requirements.txt` states the ranges the code actually needs and stays
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the file you edit; regenerate the lock after a deliberate upgrade (the header in
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the lock says how).
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This is the only step that needs the Internet. It downloads Python and npm
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packages; it does **not** download a tokenizer or a font, because both are
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vendored in the tree — see "What was made offline-safe" below.
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You also need the models, once:
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```bash
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ollama pull qwen2.5:3b-instruct
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ollama pull nomic-embed-text # only if you want the memory bank
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```
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There is no account to create and nothing to log in to. The application is
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single-user: whoever can reach it on loopback is its owner.
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## Running
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**Development** — backend on `:8000`, Vite dev server on `:5173`:
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```bash
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./start.sh
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```
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**Production-shaped** — one server, SPA served by FastAPI:
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```bash
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cd frontend && npm run build && cd ..
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cd backend && .venv/bin/uvicorn app.main:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
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```
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Then open <http://127.0.0.1:8000>.
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**Docker**:
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```bash
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docker compose up --build
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```
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### The listener is loopback, and stays loopback
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`start.sh`, `start.ps1` and the production command above all pass
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`--host 127.0.0.1` explicitly. `docker-compose.yml` publishes
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`127.0.0.1:8000:8000` — the process inside the container listens on `0.0.0.0`
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because a published port cannot reach anything else, but the port is only
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bound on the host's loopback.
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That is a requirement, not a preference. In local mode the storyteller API is
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single-user and unauthenticated: anything that can reach it can read and
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rewrite every campaign. Putting Ollama on another machine (below) does **not**
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change this — it is an outbound connection and needs no inbound exposure.
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If you publish the port to `0.0.0.0` anyway, you have made a deliberate
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decision that this project's threat model does not cover
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(`planning/SECURITY-THREAT-MODEL.md`).
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## Pointing the storyteller at Ollama
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The endpoint, the model and the generation parameters are **runtime settings
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stored in the database**, not environment variables. There is no API key field:
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M2 removed it along with the cloud providers, and Ollama does not use one. Set
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them on the app's Settings page, or with one request:
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```bash
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curl -X PUT http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/settings \
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-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"endpoint_url":"http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1","model":"qwen2.5:3b-instruct",
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"api_mode":"chat","max_output_tokens":200,
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"context_token_budget":4096}'
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```
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`POST /api/settings/test` (the **Test connection** button) returns
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`{"ok": true, "models": [...]}` and is the fastest way to tell a wrong endpoint
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from a missing model. When it fails it says which kind of failure it was, and
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they need different things done about them:
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| `kind` | What it means |
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| --- | --- |
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| `rejected` | The endpoint is outside the policy below. Not a network problem. |
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| `unreachable` | Nothing answered. Ollama is not running there, or the port is wrong. |
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| `tls` | The certificate did not verify — install the CA (see below). |
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| `timeout` | It accepted the connection and then said nothing. |
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| `http` | It answered with an error status; the body is included. |
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A successful test also warns when the endpoint is reachable but has no model by
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the configured name, which is the commonest way for a correct endpoint to still
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fail every turn.
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### Which endpoints are allowed
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`backend/app/endpoints.py` decides, and it is deliberately narrow: **loopback,
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your own LAN, or nothing.** The allowed networks are `127.0.0.0/8`, the three
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RFC1918 ranges, link-local, IPv6 loopback and unique-local, and `100.64.0.0/10`
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(carrier-grade NAT, which is what a mesh VPN such as Tailscale hands out).
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Every address the endpoint's hostname resolves to must be in one of them. A
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public address is refused, a name resolving to both a private and a public
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address is refused, and known cloud inference hosts are refused by name so the
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error says why rather than looking like a DNS fault.
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The rule is applied when you save the endpoint *and* again before every
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outbound request, so a database edited by hand or a hostname that starts
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resolving somewhere new cannot turn a local install into an exfiltration path.
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There is no setting to relax it.
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### Same host (the default)
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```text
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endpoint_url = http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1
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```
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Nothing else to do. Ollama's own default is to listen on loopback.
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### An Ollama on another machine on your trusted LAN
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Supported and explicitly configured — never guessed, never discovered.
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On the **inference machine**, tell Ollama to accept connections from the LAN,
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because it binds loopback by default:
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```bash
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OLLAMA_HOST=0.0.0.0:11434 ollama serve
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```
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On the **storyteller machine**, set the endpoint to that host's address:
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```text
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endpoint_url = http://192.168.1.50:11434/v1
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```
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Use an IP address or a name your own network resolves. Then:
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- the storyteller UI/API stays on `127.0.0.1` — do not change the listener;
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- prompts, story text, retrieved memories and embedding inputs all travel to
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that host, so it has to be one you control, on a network you trust;
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- the inference machine needs the models installed, not the storyteller;
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- no Internet is involved in either direction.
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A LAN endpoint is accepted because it is on one of the allowed networks above.
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Nothing else about it is special.
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#### If that endpoint is HTTPS with your own CA
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Some inference hosts are only reachable over TLS. A StartOS server is one: it
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serves Ollama over HTTPS with a certificate from its own local CA, and plain
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HTTP redirects to it.
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Install that CA on the machine running the storyteller, the same way you would
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for the browser — on Debian and Ubuntu:
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```bash
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sudo cp your-ca.crt /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/
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sudo update-ca-certificates
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```
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then use the `https://` URL and the hostname the certificate is issued for:
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```text
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endpoint_url = https://inference.lan:8443/v1
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```
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The application verifies against the machine's CA store **and** the `certifi`
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bundle (`backend/app/tlstrust.py`), so a CA you installed at the OS level is
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honoured, exactly as `curl` and your browser honour it. Public certificates
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keep working unchanged.
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There is deliberately **no** setting to skip verification. If a connection is
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refused with `CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED`, the CA is not installed where the
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storyteller can see it, or the URL's hostname does not match the certificate —
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`openssl s_client -connect host:port` will say which. In a container, remember
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the CA has to be inside the image or bind-mounted; the host's store is not
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visible from within.
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## Tests
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```bash
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cd backend && .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q # 698 tests
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cd frontend && npm run lint && npm run build
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```
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Two files are the M1 regression guards.
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`test_offline_assets.py` fails if the tokenizer starts fetching its table
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again, if a remote font or stylesheet comes back, or if the CSP names a remote
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origin. Two of its checks read the built SPA under `frontend/dist/` and skip
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when it has not been built, so run `npm run build` before treating a green
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suite as complete evidence.
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`test_tls_trust.py` fails if outbound verification is weakened, if a public CA
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is lost from the union, or if a new HTTP client is added without the shared
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verification context.
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M4 added `test_save_points.py`, which fails if restoring a Save Point starts
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deleting history, stops going through the active head, forks on its own, lets a
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Save Point on one campaign be restored through another, or lets deleting a branch
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take a Save Point with it. It also fails if listing Save Points goes back to one
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query per Save Point, or starts fetching narration to render the list.
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`test_process_restart.py` is the durability guard: it starts the application as a
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real subprocess, kills it, and starts a second one against the same database. A
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Save Point that survived only because a Python object was still alive would pass
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an in-process test and fail a user's restart.
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M2 added two more. `test_endpoint_policy.py` fails if the set of reachable
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addresses widens, or if either place the rule is applied stops applying it —
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it resolves hostnames through a stub, so it tests the policy rather than
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whatever DNS the machine has. `test_local_only_surface.py` fails if a removed
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subsystem comes back as a route, if an API key becomes settable again, if the
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model timeout stops being configurable or becomes unbounded, or if a supported
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start path stops binding loopback.
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## What was made offline-safe, and how to check
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Two runtime downloads were removed in Milestone M1. Both were invisible on a
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machine that had been online once, which is exactly why they need tests.
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**The tokenizer.** `tiktoken.get_encoding("cl100k_base")` downloads a 1.7 MB
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BPE table on first use, and the context builder counts tokens on every turn, so
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the first story turn on an air-gapped install died with a `ConnectionError`.
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The table is vendored at `backend/app/context/vendor/cl100k_base.tiktoken` and
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`backend/app/context/encoding.py` builds the encoding from it, verifying its
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SHA-256 against the digest `tiktoken` itself pins.
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**The fonts.** The SPA linked `fonts.googleapis.com` from `index.html`, so
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every page load fetched a stylesheet and font files from Google. The three
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families are self-hosted under `frontend/public/fonts/`, declared in
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`frontend/src/styles/fonts.css`, and re-vendored by
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`python3 frontend/tools/vendor_fonts.py`. The CSP in `backend/app/main.py` now
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names no remote origin at all.
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To convince yourself on a machine that has already been online, run the app
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with no route out rather than trusting a cold cache:
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```bash
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docker network create --internal offline
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docker run -d --name ollama --network offline -v ollama-models:/root/.ollama ollama/ollama
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docker build -t storyteller .
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# The app shares Ollama's network namespace, so Ollama is on its loopback and
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# neither has a route to the Internet.
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docker run -d --name app --network container:ollama -v story-data:/data \
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storyteller uvicorn app.main:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
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docker exec app python -c "import socket; socket.create_connection(('1.1.1.1',443),timeout=4)"
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# -> OSError: Network is unreachable, and story turns still work
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```
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`planning/archive/milestone-reports/M1-BASELINE-REPORT.md` records the run this procedure is
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taken from, including the packet captures.
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## Things still inherited from upstream
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M2 removed the hosted, cloud, account, analytics, Postgres/Render and QuickJS
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scripting surfaces outright — `PROVENANCE.md` lists exactly what went. What is
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left of upstream that a newcomer might report as a defect:
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- **Inert legacy tables and columns.** Five tables and four columns M2 emptied
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of meaning are still in the schema, unmapped, so an M1-era campaign database
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opens unchanged. Nothing reads or writes them. A cleanup migration waits for
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the schema to settle after M5 (`planning/BUILD-MILESTONES.md`).
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- **Dual-dialect migration code.** `backend/app/migrations.py` still carries
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SQLite/Postgres branches from upstream, although Postgres support itself is
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gone and SQLite is the only store. Same cleanup, same milestone.
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- **`.github/workflows/ci.yml`** is upstream's GitHub Actions pipeline. This
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repository lives on a self-hosted Gitea; the workflow is kept for provenance
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and is not what runs the tests here.
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- **No frontend tests.** `npm run lint && npm run build` is the whole frontend
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check. A test runner is M8's job.
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