interactive-story/planning/reports/M2-BASELINE-REPORT.md

# M2 — Baseline Report (evidence record)

**Date:** 2026-09-02
**Milestone:** M2, *Remove Hosted, Cloud, Scripting, and Unneeded Deployment Surface*
**Companion:** `planning/reports/M2-IMPLEMENTATION-REPORT.md` interprets this file.
Where the two disagree on a runtime or test fact, **this file is the record.**

This is measurement, not commentary. Command output is quoted verbatim.
Anything inferred rather than observed is labelled **[inferred]**.

Hostnames and LAN addresses are **placeholders** — `inference.lan`,
`192.168.0.50`, port `8443`. The real ones are in the workspace's untracked
notes, never in this repository. Packet counts, digests, timings and status
codes are exact.

---

## 0. Test environment

| | |
| --- | --- |
| Host | Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS, x86-64, 4 cores, 15 GB RAM, **no GPU** |
| Python | 3.12.3 |
| Node / npm | 22.23.1 / 10.9.8 |
| Docker | 29.7.2 |
| Ollama (same-host) | `ollama/ollama:latest` in a container, models from a shared volume |
| Ollama (LAN) | 0.33.0 on a **second physical machine**, HTTPS, certificate from a private CA |
| Models | `qwen2.5:0.5b`, `qwen2.5:3b-instruct`, `nomic-embed-text` |
| Image under test | `m2-final`, built from the working tree by `docker build .` |

> **Timings in this file are not benchmarks.** This host was shared with
> unrelated work during the review; `uptime` reported a 1-minute load average
> ranging from **1.79 to 74.08** across the session on four cores. Where a
> measurement was taken under load, it says so. Latency figures are recorded
> because they mattered to a *timeout* result, not as performance data.

---

## 1. Repository and provenance

```console
$ git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD
m2-local-only-surface

$ git log --format='%H %G? %s' -3
8c65ae99deda49b22f415d5868987e00bbcb173c G M2: cut the hosted product away from the local one
1a28a9a708985e7c98dcbcb87c189e7582ec288d G Apply post-M1 corrections to the planning package
645f07f06d226e274c33d96e71d9c374413ef771 G Add the M1 implementation review report
```

All three commits verify (`%G? = G`). The repository signs every commit; nothing
in this milestone is unsigned.

### Commit chain

| Commit | Sig | Parent | Meaning |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `8c65ae9` | G | `1a28a9a` | **The M2 commit.** One commit, no merges. |
| `1a28a9a` | G | `645f07f` | Post-M1 planning corrections — the M1 baseline this milestone started from |
| `7f182a8` | G | `717670a`, `d72f7c1` | the fork import, two parents |

### Upstream ancestry

```console
$ git cat-file -t d72f7c1bda0f34fccd84afb7a25c34eb01c901de
commit
$ git merge-base --is-ancestor d72f7c1bda0f34fccd84afb7a25c34eb01c901de HEAD && echo yes
yes
$ git rev-list --count d72f7c1bda0f34fccd84afb7a25c34eb01c901de
172
$ git diff --stat d72f7c1bda0f34fccd84afb7a25c34eb01c901de HEAD -- LICENSE
(no output)
```

All 172 upstream commits reachable; `LICENSE` byte-identical to upstream; no
re-import or upstream substitution occurred. `PROVENANCE.md` and
`DEVELOPMENT.md` are present and were updated for M2.

### Private data

```console
$ grep -rn "<the real LAN hostname>\|<the real LAN subnet>\|<the real port>" \
    --include=*.py --include=*.md --include=*.jsx --include=*.js \
    --include=*.yml --include=*.txt backend frontend *.md *.yml Dockerfile
(no output)
```

No private hostname, LAN address, certificate or credential is committed.

### Working tree

At the M2 commit the tree was clean. **This review then modified six files**
(§9), so `git status` is *not* clean as this report is written:

```text
 M backend/app/memorybank.py
 M backend/app/models.py
 M backend/app/routers/adventures/turns.py
 M backend/app/routers/chat.py
 M backend/requirements.lock
 M backend/tests/test_local_only_surface.py
```

Every runtime result below was produced by an image built from that modified
tree, except where explicitly marked as pre-fix.

---

## 2. Change inventory

```console
$ git diff --shortstat 1a28a9a 8c65ae9
 94 files changed, 1395 insertions(+), 6578 deletions(-)
```

**Added (3):**

```text
backend/app/endpoints.py
backend/tests/test_endpoint_policy.py
backend/tests/test_local_only_surface.py
```

**Deleted (24):**

```text
backend/app/accesslog.py                     backend/tests/test_accesslog.py
backend/app/analytics.py                     backend/tests/test_analytics.py
backend/app/cleanup.py                       backend/tests/test_guest_cleanup.py
backend/app/netguard.py                      backend/tests/test_netguard.py
backend/app/security.py                      backend/tests/test_ratelimit_hardening.py
backend/app/routers/analytics.py             backend/tests/test_reasoning_param.py
backend/app/routers/auth.py
backend/app/routers/scripts.py               frontend/src/pages/Analytics.jsx
backend/app/routers/adventures/scripts.py    frontend/src/pages/Scripts.jsx
backend/app/scripting/__init__.py            frontend/src/pages/ScriptEditor.jsx
backend/app/scripting/engine.py              frontend/src/pages/Play/panels/ScriptsPanel.jsx
backend/app/scripting/pipeline.py            frontend/src/pages/Play/drawers/StatusDrawer.jsx
                                             render.yaml
```

**Largest modifications:**

```text
  +93  -37   backend/app/routers/settings.py
  +54  -82   backend/app/providers/openai_compatible.py
  +44 -166   backend/tests/test_chat.py
  +38  -81   backend/app/routers/chat.py
  +37 -222   backend/app/auth.py
  +32  -69   backend/app/main.py
  +31 -195   backend/app/limits.py
  +28 -178   backend/app/models.py
  +22  -43   backend/app/database.py
  +19  -58   frontend/src/pages/Settings.jsx
  +18  -97   backend/app/routers/adventures/turns.py
  +15  -85   frontend/src/App.jsx
```

---

## 3. Surface reduction, measured

### API routes (from the OpenAPI schema, not by grep)

| Prefix | M1 | M2 |
| --- | ---: | ---: |
| `/api/adventures` | 25 | 21 |
| `/api/analytics` | 3 | **0** |
| `/api/auth` | 4 | **0** |
| `/api/scripts` | 5 | **0** |
| `/api/chat` | 2 | 2 |
| `/api/scenarios` | 5 | 5 |
| `/api/settings` | 2 | 2 |
| `/api/story-cards` | 4 | 4 |
| `/api/debug`, `/api/health` | 2 | 2 |
| **Total** | **52** | **36** |

### Dependencies

```console
$ diff <(M1 requirements.txt) <(M2 requirements.txt) | grep '^<'
< quickjs>=1.19
< cryptography>=42
< psycopg[binary]>=3.2
```

Installed closure, measured by building a clean venv from `requirements.txt` +
`requirements-dev.txt`:

| | M1 | M2 |
| --- | ---: | ---: |
| Python packages installed | 40 | **34** |
| Packages gone | — | `cffi`, `cryptography`, `psycopg`, `psycopg-binary`, `pycparser`, `quickjs` |
| npm runtime dependencies | 6 | **3** |
| npm packages installed (`npm ls --all`) | 53 | **32** |

### Code size

| | M1 | M2 | Δ |
| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| `backend/app` Python lines | 14 298 | 11 632 | −2 666 |
| `frontend/src` JS/JSX lines | 6 523 | 5 239 | −1 284 |
| `frontend/src/pages` files | 21 | 16 | −5 |

### Environment variables actually read (`os.environ`)

```console
$ grep -rn "os.environ" backend/app/
backend/app/database.py:18:_env_db_path = os.environ.get("AIDND_DB_PATH")
backend/app/main.py:30:    for o in os.environ.get("AIDND_CORS_ORIGINS", "").split(",")
```

Two, down from ten. `AIDND_MULTI_USER`, `AIDND_SECRET_KEY`, `AIDND_COOKIE_SECURE`,
`AIDND_DEMO_API_KEY`, `AIDND_DEMO_ENDPOINT_URL`, `AIDND_DEMO_MODELS`,
`AIDND_DEMO_TURNS_PER_DAY`, `AIDND_POWER_USERS`, `AIDND_ANALYTICS_EMAILS`,
`AIDND_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS`, `AIDND_DATABASE_URL` and `DATABASE_URL` are no
longer read. Four of those names still appear in the tree **as prose in
comments** explaining what was removed; `grep` above shows no read.

---

## 4. Test suite

```console
$ cd backend && .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q
606 passed, 1 warning in 126.29s (0:02:06)
```

Zero failed, zero skipped, zero xfailed. The one warning is the inherited
Starlette/`httpx` deprecation notice, present since M1.

### Accounting for every test

Counted by diffing collected node IDs between `1a28a9a` (M1) and the working
tree, not by reading diffs:

| | Count |
| --- | ---: |
| Distinct test functions, M1 | 610 |
| Distinct test functions, M2 | 561 |
| Node IDs gone | 88 |
| Node IDs new | 39 |
| Collected tests (with parametrisation), M1 | 648 |
| Collected tests, M2 | **606** |

**Gone, by file:**

| File | Gone | Disposition |
| --- | ---: | --- |
| `test_analytics.py` | 25 | whole file — subject removed |
| `test_guest_cleanup.py` | 14 | whole file — subject removed |
| `test_accesslog.py` | 12 | whole file — subject removed |
| `test_ratelimit_hardening.py` | 8 | whole file — subject removed |
| `test_chat.py` | 8 | demo-key pinning and the power-user gate |
| `test_reasoning_param.py` | 5 | whole file — subject removed |
| `test_netguard.py` | 5 | whole file — replaced by `test_endpoint_policy.py` |
| `test_prompt_caching.py` | 4 | OpenRouter upstream routing |
| `test_memory_rewrite.py` | 4 | 2 retired (Postgres DSN masking), **2 renamed** |
| `test_delete_state.py` | 1 | **renamed** |
| `test_branch_forking.py` | 1 | **renamed** |
| `test_branch_clause.py` | 1 | scripting history API |

**Four of the 88 are renames with equivalent coverage**, so 84 tests were
genuinely retired:

```text
test_branch_forking:  test_switching_restores_the_script_and_world_state
                   -> test_switching_restores_the_state_a_branch_left_behind
test_delete_state:    test_deleting_the_ai_turn_rewinds_the_script_state
                   -> test_deleting_the_ai_turn_rewinds_the_counter
test_memory_rewrite:  test_an_owner_with_no_api_key_is_skipped
                   -> test_an_adventure_with_no_model_configured_is_skipped
test_memory_rewrite:  test_an_api_key_on_the_command_line_covers_that_owner
                   -> test_a_model_on_the_command_line_covers_that_adventure
```

**New, by file:** `test_local_only_surface.py` 18, `test_endpoint_policy.py`
14, `test_chat.py` 3, plus the 4 renames. Collected with parametrisation:
`test_endpoint_policy.py` 31, `test_local_only_surface.py` 32.

### Instrumentation conversion, not deletion

Eight files used a QuickJS `output` hook (`state.gold += 10`) as deterministic
instrumentation for the **state snapshot and rollback machinery**, which M2 does
not touch. The counter moved to the world-state engine — the model emits a
` ```state ` delta block, the referee applies it — and the assertions are
unchanged in substance. Affected: `test_take_state`, `test_attempt_siblings`,
`test_branch_forking`, `test_bundle_v2`, `test_delete_state`,
`test_retry_variants`, `test_story_tree_baseline`, `test_turn_flow_integration`,
plus `test_state_revert` converted from `script_state`/`state_after` to
`world_state`/`world_state_after`.

### Frontend and image

```console
$ npm run lint          # oxlint
exit 0                  # 7 warnings, all pre-existing react/only-export-components
$ npm run build
dist/assets/index-C9v6AJ3R.js   395.41 kB │ gzip: 120.01 kB     ✓ built in 496ms
$ docker build .
exit 0
```

There are no automated frontend tests in the repository — none existed at M1
either.

Bundle size: **933.69 kB → 395.41 kB** (M1 → M2), from removing CodeMirror with
the script editor.

---

## 5. Offline run — same-host Ollama

**Topology.** `--internal` Docker network (no NAT, no external DNS). Ollama in
one container; the `m2-final` image in a second container sharing Ollama's
network namespace, so Ollama sits on the storyteller's own loopback. tcpdump ran
in that namespace for the whole session.

### 5.1 Isolation, verified before any test

```text
  blocked 1.1.1.1:443  OSError
  blocked 140.82.121.4:443  OSError
  no resolution  fonts.googleapis.com
  no resolution  fonts.gstatic.com
  no resolution  openaipublic.blob.core.windows.net
  no resolution  openrouter.ai
  no resolution  api.openai.com
  no resolution  github.com
```

### 5.2 Listeners

```text
  LISTEN 127.0.0.1:8000        <- the storyteller
  LISTEN 127.0.0.11:42229      <- Docker's embedded DNS
  LISTEN 127.0.0.1:43093       <- Ollama's model runner
  LISTEN 127.0.0.1:43313       <- Ollama's model runner
  LISTEN [::]:11434            <- Ollama itself
```

Nothing the storyteller owns is bound off loopback.

### 5.3 Ollama-only settings and diagnostics

```json
endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1 | model: qwen2.5:0.5b
embed: nomic-embed-text:latest | timeout: 600
connection test: {"ok": true, "models": ["qwen2.5:7b-instruct",
  "qwen2.5:3b-instruct", "nomic-embed-text:latest", "qwen2.5:0.5b"]}
```

### 5.4 Story generation and streaming

```text
  turn 1 (  1.7s,  90 stream chunks): 'Oh, how unfortunate! A lighthouse keeper indeed! The light'
  turn 2 ( 35.2s,  90 stream chunks): 'I climb the spiral stair to the lamp room. My hand tightly'
  turn 3 (  7.1s,  90 stream chunks): "I search the keeper's log for the last entry. The last ent"
  turn 4: ERROR {'type': 'error', 'detail': 'The AI endpoint timed out.'}
```

Turn 4 timed out at the configured 600 s. The application logged no error. Ollama
reported the model still resident. `uptime` at the time: 1-minute load average
had risen from 1.79 to the tens on four cores from unrelated work on this host.
**[inferred]** the timeout is host contention rather than an application fault;
what is *measured* is that no application error was logged and that the same
build produced turns in 1.7–35.2 s minutes earlier.

### 5.5 Local embeddings, end to end through the app

```text
  wrote memory id=1, embedded=False
  turn to trigger the pass (101.6s)
  memories: 1  embedded with the local model: 1
```

Direct timing of the embedding endpoint from inside the container:

```text
  embedding round trip: 3.4s, dim=768
  second embedding (warm): 0.1s
```

### 5.6 Branch-scoped memory isolation — positive and negative controls

```text
main branch = 1
  memories on main: 0   ALPHA present: False
forking at AI action 22 (an earlier turn, so this starts a new line)
  fork events: ['chunk', 'chunk', 'done']
  branches now: 2, fork = 5

ON THE FORK (0 memories)
  ALPHA visible: False    <- ALPHA is anchored at main's head, which is BELOW the
                             fork point, so the fork correctly does not inherit it
  BETA written here, visible: True    <- positive control

BACK ON MAIN (1 memories)
  ALPHA visible: True    <- positive control
  BETA visible:  False   <- NEGATIVE CONTROL, must be False
```

The decisive result is the last line: a memory written on the fork is **not**
visible on main.

### 5.7 A05 — a failed model call, and a hand-edited database

```text
baseline: (8 actions, 3 accepted AI turns, digest 07615da99b014b70)

-- invalid local model --
  events: ['player', 'error']
  error: Endpoint or model not found (HTTP 404). Check the endpoint URL and that model 'n…
  after: (7, 3, 'e18de9dff6455e0d')

-- endpoint refused by policy at request time --
  (the settings row was edited directly with sqlite3, behind the app's back,
   to https://openrouter.ai/api/v1)
  events: ['player', 'error']
  error: This endpoint can't be used — openrouter.ai is a cloud inference service — this build…
  after: (8, 3, '157c882c60579617')
```

The **accepted AI-turn count stayed at 3** through both failures. Only the
player's own typed action was added each time, which is M1's documented and
deliberate behaviour.

The second case is the strongest form of the endpoint evidence: the request-time
check refused a cloud endpoint that had been written straight into SQLite,
bypassing the API's save-time validation entirely.

### 5.8 Restart and resume

```text
before restart: 8 actions, digest 157c882c60579617
  branches: 2  memories: 1
after restart:  8 actions, digest 157c882c60579617
  branches: 2  memories: 1
  settings preserved: endpoint http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1 timeout 600
  context inspection: ['narrator', 'persona', 'history', 'used_memories']
```

### 5.9 Packet capture — whole offline session

```text
all packets:               5131
loopback (127.0.0.0/8):    5086
non-loopback unicast:      0
TCP connections opened outside loopback:  (none)
```

DNS queries, attributed by timestamp rather than assumed:

| Name | First seen | Attribution |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `fonts.googleapis.com` | 16:44:02.800449 | **the isolation probe** in §5.1 |
| `openaipublic.blob.core.windows.net` | 16:44:02.802749 | the isolation probe |
| `openrouter.ai` | 16:44:02.803260 | the isolation probe |
| `api.openai.com` | 16:44:02.803956 | the isolation probe |
| `github.com` | 16:44:02.804747 | the isolation probe |
| `ollama-container` | 18:28:55.684172 | the endpoint-policy edge-case test (§7) |
| `ollama.com` | 16:53:29 … 18:28:05 | **the Ollama server's own lookup** |

```text
capture window:                       16:44:02.800136 .. 18:51:29.080336
first packet to the storyteller API:  16:44:47.639083
```

Every cloud/font/tokenizer lookup landed within **5 milliseconds of the capture
starting and 45 seconds before the storyteller received its first request** —
they are the deliberate probe, not the application. `ollama.com` recurs
throughout and is issued by the separately installed Ollama service, the same
observation M1 recorded.

---

## 6. Offline run — trusted-LAN Ollama over HTTPS

**Topology.** Ollama 0.33.0 on a **second physical machine** on the trusted LAN,
serving HTTPS with a certificate from a private CA. The storyteller ran in a
container with `NET_ADMIN`, its **default route deleted** and replaced with a
route to the LAN subnet only, its resolver pointed at nothing, and the host name
supplied as a static hosts entry.

### 6.1 Isolation and binding

```text
=== isolation ===
  blocked 1.1.1.1:443 OSError
  blocked 140.82.121.4:443 OSError
  no resolution github.com
  no resolution openrouter.ai
  no resolution fonts.gstatic.com
=== the approved LAN host ===
  inference.lan -> 192.168.0.50
  TLS verified, peer CN = inference.lan
=== listeners ===
  LISTEN 127.0.0.1:8000
```

Nothing listens on the container's own LAN-facing address.

### 6.2 Diagnostics and generation

```text
endpoint: https://inference.lan:8443/v1 | timeout: 600 s
diagnostics: {"ok": true, "models": ["qwen2.5:3b-instruct", "nomic-embed-text:latest"]}
turn 1 ( 10.7s, 24 chunks): 'You check the oil and wick, their greasy slicks staining your hand'
turn 2 (  4.0s, 17 chunks): 'The air is thick with the musty scent of the old building as you a'
turn 3 (  4.6s, 26 chunks): 'You find the last entry: "Exhausted... Oil\'s low..." The room feel'

memories: 1  embedded via the LAN host: 1
```

### 6.3 Every model request the application made

```text
    4  https://inference.lan:8443/v1/chat/completions
    1  https://inference.lan:8443/v1/embeddings
```

Narration and embeddings both went to the configured host over verified TLS. No
other URL appears.

### 6.4 Retry keeps the discarded attempt

Measured on the shipped image, against the LAN host:

```text
head AI action before retry: 8   take_count 1
  retry produced (13.7s): 'You jot down a hurried note: "Visited lamp—oil low—oil lamp '
head AI action after retry:  9   take_count 2   take_index 1
alternate takes retained: 2
   - 'Your pen touches the cold wood of the log, the friction'
   - 'You jot down a hurried note: "Visited lamp—oil low—oil '
branches: 1
```

A retry at the tip files the new attempt as a sibling at the same coordinate and
keeps the one it replaced. No branch is created, which is correct for a retry at
the head.

### 6.5 Restart and resume

```text
before restart: 8 actions, digest 66cc82944f8b6eef
after restart:  8 actions, digest 66cc82944f8b6eef
  endpoint preserved: https://inference.lan:8443/v1  timeout 600
  memories: 1
```

### 6.6 Packet capture

```text
all packets:                 685
loopback:                    364
to/from the LAN Ollama host: 308
any other unicast:           0
DNS queries:                 none
```

Zero DNS: the endpoint was configured, not discovered.

---

## 7. Endpoint policy

Run inside the shipped image:

```text
  ALLOW   same-host loopback       http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1
  ALLOW   localhost name           http://localhost:11434/v1
  ALLOW   IPv6 loopback            http://[::1]:11434/v1
  ALLOW   LAN literal              http://192.168.1.50:11434/v1
  ALLOW   link-local               http://169.254.10.5:11434/v1
  ALLOW   CGNAT / mesh VPN         http://100.64.3.4:11434/v1
  ALLOW   IPv6 unique-local        http://[fd00::5]:11434/v1
  ALLOW   docker internal name     http://ollama-container:11434/v1
  REJECT  cloud provider           https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
           openrouter.ai is a cloud inference service — this build talks to Ollama on your own mach…
  REJECT  cloud provider           https://api.openai.com/v1
  REJECT  public IPv4              http://8.8.8.8:11434/v1
           8.8.8.8 resolves to 8.8.8.8, which is a public Internet address — …
  REJECT  public IPv6              http://[2001:4860:4860::8888]/v1
  REJECT  unspecified address      http://0.0.0.0:11434/v1
           0.0.0.0 … is not on this machine and not on your own network …
  REJECT  wrong scheme             ftp://127.0.0.1/v1
```

Over the HTTP API, from inside the offline container:

```text
=== cloud and public endpoints are refused ===
  400  https://openrouter.ai/api/v1     That endpoint can't be used — openrouter.ai is a cloud…
  400  https://api.openai.com/v1        …
  400  https://api.groq.com/openai/v1   …
  400  http://8.8.8.8:11434/v1          …8.8.8.8 … is a public Internet address…
=== local and LAN endpoints are accepted ===
  200  http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1
  200  http://192.168.1.50:11434/v1
  200  http://[::1]:11434/v1
```

Request-time enforcement against a hand-edited database is in §5.7.

`test_endpoint_policy.py` (31 collected) resolves hostnames through a stub, so
it exercises the policy rather than the machine's DNS. It covers the split-horizon
case: a name resolving to both `192.168.1.50` and a public address is refused.

---

## 8. TLS trust

```console
$ grep -rn "verify=False\|ssl._create_unverified\|CERT_NONE\|check_hostname = False" backend/app
(the only match is prose in tlstrust.py saying such an option deliberately does not exist)

$ grep -rn "httpx.AsyncClient(\|httpx.Client(" backend/app
backend/app/routers/settings.py:122
backend/app/providers/openai_compatible.py:214
backend/app/providers/openai_compatible.py:326
backend/app/providers/openai_compatible.py:360
```

Four clients, all four passing `verify=tlstrust.ssl_context()`. Enforced by
`test_tls_trust.py`, which walks the AST of the two modules that make outbound
requests and fails if any `httpx.AsyncClient` is constructed without `verify`,
or if a third module starts making requests:

```console
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_tls_trust.py -q
6 passed in 0.20s
```

Runtime confirmation of certificate **and** hostname verification against the
real private-CA host is §6.1 (`TLS verified, peer CN = inference.lan`), and of
all four paths — settings/test, narration, model listing, embeddings — §6.2–6.3.

### Modules that can open an outbound connection at all

```console
$ grep -rln "httpx\|requests\.\|urllib.request\|socket\.\|aiohttp\|websocket" backend/app
backend/app/endpoints.py            # getaddrinfo only, for the policy
backend/app/providers/openai_compatible.py
backend/app/routers/settings.py
backend/app/tlstrust.py             # builds the SSL context; opens nothing
```

Remaining absolute URLs anywhere in backend application code:

```text
      3 http://127.0.0.1
      2 http://localhost
      1 https://openaipublic.blob.core.windows.net   <- a comment and a SOURCE_URL
                                                        constant in encoding.py; never fetched
```

---

## 9. Defects found during this review

Three, all found by running the shipped build rather than by reading it. Each was
corrected because the M2 evidence could not otherwise be accurate; each is
reported rather than absorbed.

### 9.1 The memory bank was broken — summaries and embeddings silently stopped

```text
Task exception was never retrieved
future: <Task finished coro=<run_post_turn() ...> exception=AttributeError(
  "'Settings' object has no attribute 'api_key_plain'")>
  File "/app/backend/app/memorybank.py", line 155, in summary_provider
    settings.api_key_plain,
```

M2 removed `Settings.api_key_plain` with the API key, but `memorybank`'s two
provider factories still read it. It failed in a fire-and-forget background
task, so nothing surfaced to the user and no test caught it: every memory test
stubs those factories out. **All 604 tests passed with this defect present.**

Fixed by rewriting both factories. Covered by a new test that constructs every
provider factory from a real `Settings` row.

### 9.2 The configurable model timeout never reached the turn engine

`settings.model_timeout_seconds` was stored, validated, exposed in the API and
rendered in the UI — and not passed to `OpenAICompatibleProvider` in
`turns.py` or `chat.py`, so generation used the module default. The M2 exit
criterion "no longer an undocumented hardcoded limitation" was therefore only
half met: the constant had moved, but the setting was inert.

Fixed in both call sites. Covered by a new test that drives the turn endpoint,
the chat endpoint and the summariser factory and asserts the configured value
reaches each.

### 9.3 `requirements.lock` still pinned the removed packages

```console
$ grep -n "quickjs\|psycopg\|cryptography" backend/requirements.lock
25:cryptography==50.0.1
36:psycopg==3.3.5
37:psycopg-binary==3.3.5
45:quickjs==1.19.4
```

`DEVELOPMENT.md` tells a new developer to install from the lock, which would have
reinstalled all three. Regenerated: 40 pins → 34.

### Verification after the fixes

```console
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q
606 passed, 1 warning in 126.29s
$ npm run lint   # exit 0
$ npm run build  # ✓ built in 496ms
$ docker build . # exit 0
```

All §5 and §6 runtime evidence above was produced by an image built **after**
these fixes.

---

## 10. M1 capability regression checks

| M1 capability | Result | Evidence |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Vendored tokenizer, no first-turn download | PASS | §10.1 |
| Self-hosted fonts | PASS | §10.2 |
| Same-origin runtime assets | PASS | §10.2 |
| Restrictive CSP | PASS | §10.2 |
| Loopback storyteller default | PASS | §5.2, §6.1, §11 |
| Same-host Ollama | PASS | §5.3–5.4 |
| Trusted-LAN Ollama | PASS | §6.2 |
| HTTPS / private-CA trusted-LAN | PASS | §6.1–6.3 |
| Certificate + hostname verification | PASS | §6.1, §8 |
| Offline story generation | PASS | §5.1, §5.4 |
| SQLite persistence | PASS | §5.8, §6.4 |
| Full regression suite green | PASS | §4 |

### 10.1 Tokenizer, inside the shipped image, offline

```text
  vendored table sha256 matches pin: True
  count_tokens with sockets blocked: 6 tokens
```

### 10.2 Browser asset graph, fetched over loopback with no route out

```text
CSP: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
     font-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; object-src 'none';
     base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'

referenced by index.html:
  /favicon.svg              LOCAL
  /assets/index-*.js        LOCAL
  /assets/index-*.css       LOCAL

font urls inside the stylesheet:
  /fonts/cinzel-normal-latin-ext.woff2        200 font/woff2   14540
  /fonts/cinzel-normal-latin.woff2            200 font/woff2   25904
  /fonts/crimson-pro-italic-latin-ext.woff2   200 font/woff2   39808
  /fonts/crimson-pro-italic-latin.woff2       200 font/woff2   51432
  /fonts/crimson-pro-normal-latin-ext.woff2   200 font/woff2   37988
  /fonts/crimson-pro-normal-latin.woff2       200 font/woff2   48200
  /fonts/inter-normal-latin-ext.woff2         200 font/woff2   85068
  /fonts/inter-normal-latin.woff2             200 font/woff2   48256
```

Unchanged from M1, including the `object-src`/`base-uri`/`form-action`
directives M1 added.

---

## 11. Storyteller network exposure

| Launch path | Listener / publish | Verified by |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `./start.sh` (native dev) | `uvicorn --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000` | file assertion in `test_local_only_surface.py` |
| `start.ps1` (Windows) | `--host 127.0.0.1` | same test |
| Production native (documented in `DEVELOPMENT.md`) | `--host 127.0.0.1` | documentation |
| `docker compose up` | `ports: - "127.0.0.1:8000:8000"` | test parses the published mappings and asserts every one starts `127.0.0.1:` |
| Container process itself | `--host 0.0.0.0` | deliberate; the only address a published port can reach |

`DEVELOPMENT.md` states that publishing the port to `0.0.0.0` is a deliberate
decision this project's threat model does not cover. The `Dockerfile` carries the
same warning next to `EXPOSE`.

Two supporting checks:

* `AIDND_CORS_ORIGINS="*"` makes the application **refuse to start**:
  `RuntimeError: AIDND_CORS_ORIGINS must not contain '*'…`
* An unknown `/api/...` path now returns **404** instead of the SPA's HTML with
  status 200 (verified for ten removed endpoints, §12).

---

## 12. Removed-surface verification, at runtime

From inside the offline container:

```text
=== removed surfaces answer 404 ===
  404  GET /auth/me            404  GET /analytics/summary
  404  GET /auth/login         404  GET /analytics/collect
  404  GET /auth/register      404  GET /analytics/access
  404  GET /auth/logout        404  GET /scripts
                               404  GET /adventures/2/scripts
                               404  GET /adventures/2/script-state

=== no API key in the settings surface ===
  api_key present: False   has_api_key present: False
  after trying to set one: False
```

```console
$ python -c "import app.scripting"
ImportError    # asserted by test_the_application_has_no_scripting_engine
$ grep -rn "import quickjs" backend/app
(no output)
```

---

## 13. Inert schema retained for compatibility

Verified present in the database and unread by the application.

| Object | Was | Status |
| --- | --- | --- |
| table `scripts` | script library | unmapped; no model, no query |
| table `adventure_scripts` | per-adventure script copies | unmapped |
| table `analytics_daily` | visitor counters | unmapped |
| table `analytics_visitor_days` | visitor funnel | unmapped |
| table `access_log` | sign-ins, addresses, devices | unmapped |
| column `adventures.script_state` | scripting shared state | written `{}` only |
| column `actions.state_after` | scripting state per node | written `{}` only |
| column `settings.api_key` | encrypted cloud key | never read or written |
| column `settings.reasoning_max_tokens` | OpenRouter thinking budget | never read |
| column `users.demo_turns_used` / `_date` | demo cap tally | never read |
| table `users` + `user_id` FKs | multi-user ownership | **active**, one row, internal identity only |

No destructive migration was performed. One additive migration was added:

```python
(77, "ALTER TABLE settings ADD COLUMN model_timeout_seconds INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 300")
```

Existing M1 databases open unchanged: the offline run in §5 used the volume
carrying campaigns created before these fixes, and §5.8 shows the transcript
digest surviving both an image replacement and a restart.

---

## 14. What was not measured

Stated so the implementation report does not overclaim.

1. **No browser rendered the UI.** No browser automation was available. §10.2
   fetches the complete asset graph the page references, with correct media
   types and the CSP, but nobody looked at the rendered page. This is unchanged
   from M1, where the maintainer confirmed the render by hand.
2. **Sustained multi-turn play under the memory bank was not completed on this
   host.** Turns 1–3 succeeded; turn 4 timed out under third-party CPU load
   (§5.4). The individual capabilities — narration, streaming, embeddings,
   memory writes, retry, fork, restart — were each measured separately.
3. **No load, soak or long-campaign testing.** Out of scope for M2.

---

# 15. Closeout note — appended 2026-09-03

**This section was appended after the fact and is not part of the original
evidence record.** Everything above was written on 2026-09-02 and describes the
repository as it stood then. Nothing above has been rewritten, including its
references to a working tree that was dirty at the time.

## What the original report correctly said

The report above correctly described commit `8c65ae9` — the M2 implementation
commit — as **not containing** the three fixes this review found. At the time it
was written, those fixes existed only in the working tree, six files ahead of
that commit. Every runtime measurement in this report was produced by an image
built from that fixed tree, which the report states plainly.

## What happened afterwards

The six-file correction was committed:

```text
8652fe7cd84bca5173abb03b2a692f15fea8a98c   M2 review: two regressions the green suite hid, and the reports
```

That commit carries the six implementation/test/lockfile files **and** the two
M2 reports themselves, which is why this report's own history begins there. The
provenance distinction the review asked for is preserved regardless:
`8c65ae9` is the M2 implementation, `8652fe7` is the review correction, and the
two were never squashed.

## Verification at closeout

Re-run on 2026-09-03 against the committed tree — not the working tree — so that
what was verified is exactly what the repository contains:

```text
backend    .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q     606 passed in 133.26s
frontend   npm run lint                             7 warnings, 0 errors, exit 0
frontend   npm run build                            built in 932ms; index.js 395.41 kB
root       docker build -t storyteller-m2-closeout .    exit 0
git        status --short                           clean
```

The 606 figure matches the count this report recorded, from the same tree.

Dependency removal was verified in the built image rather than only in the
lockfile:

```text
$ docker run --rm --entrypoint sh storyteller-m2-closeout -c "pip list | grep -iE 'quickjs|psycopg|cryptography|cffi|pycparser'"
ABSENT: none of quickjs/psycopg/cryptography/cffi/pycparser installed
32 packages total
```

The network measurements in §5, §6 and §10 were **not** re-run. The six
corrected files change provider construction and a timeout value; they do not
touch the endpoint policy, the TLS trust context, or the bind addresses, so the
captures above remain the evidence for the network boundary.