JesseMarkowitzandClaude Opus 5
144406cd48
The release-validation milestone, and the thing it had to settle first was whether any of the earlier evidence meant what it said. M8 measured a deployment enforcing a 4,096-token input window while the application budgeted 16,384. Every request returned 200. What Ollama does with the excess is drop the oldest tokens, and the oldest tokens here are the system block — the narrator's rules and the campaign canon. A hundred-turn certification against that server would have looked perfect and proved nothing, which is why this milestone could not begin with a hundred turns. So the application asks now. Ollama's window is a property of how a model was loaded rather than of the request — sending num_ctx is accepted, ignored, and worse, reloads the model at the server's own default — so the only honest move is to find out and then tell the truth about it. /api/ps reports what a resident model is being served with, /api/show what an unloaded one will load with, both on the same host inference already uses, through the same endpoint policy and the same TLS trust store. A verified window is a ceiling on the budget; an unverified one leaves the budget alone and is recorded as unverified in the turn's own provenance, so an old turn can be asked afterwards whether it was built against a checked window. There is no third behaviour, and in particular no hard-coded 4,096: a number the server did not say would be right on one machine and wrong on the next. The proof that this is doing something is a campaign whose canon sits at the front of the prompt, 120 turns of history, and a 4,096-token window. The canon is still there afterwards and the oldest history is gone. The same campaign built the old way produces a prompt more than twice the window — the defect, reproduced, so the fix is measured against it rather than asserted. Two defects the validation found on its own, and they are the same defect twice: something was true and nobody was told. A manual state correction of four changes with one bad reference applied three, returned 201, and said nothing — while recording the refusal on the audit row nobody reads. It came to light because the identity diagnostic's own fixture was refused that way and the whole run proceeded on a campaign with no scene, which would have read as a model failure. And the narration-length setting moved no number: brief, medium and long each became one English sentence, while the numeric hint the model actually reads was derived from the global reply cap and said the same thing for all three. Both now say what they did. The other two post-M8 findings are closed as well. The tab said AI D&D, which no document had ever claimed it did not; it says Interactive Story now, with the open campaign first, and the name is the owner's decision rather than a find-and-replace to something narrower than the engine. After an Undo the reader could not tell where they had landed; the control row now ends with "Moment 11 · later story ahead", from the server's own answer, in the word the transcript already uses, with none of head, branch or depth anywhere near it. The identity diagnostic exists and the root cause does not. That campaign was destroyed, so no cause can be established — what M11 owes the finding is something that can classify the next occurrence, and a diagnostic that makes only the judgements a program can honestly make: duplicate keys, shared names, protagonist drift, state and context disagreeing. Whether prose misattributed a line is left to a person reading it beside its prompt, because a regex cannot read dialogue and one that pretended to would produce exactly the confident wrong answer this finding is about. Its detectors are proved to fire against a planted second Alice. Two entities may still share a display name. That was checked first, as the finding asked, and left permitted: a mother and a daughter, or a stranger giving a false name, are ordinary fiction, and refusing them to guard against a model mistake would refuse the wrong thing. What was missing was that it happened silently. It is reported now. Evidence, not inference: a hundred accepted turns against a real narrator with genuine process restarts; a real browser against the built SPA; a container with no network at all; a campaign moved into a data directory that never existed. Each was discarded and re-run whenever the product changed under it, and the runs that were thrown away are listed in the report with the reason, along with ten defects in the harnesses themselves — because a harness that has only ever agreed with itself is not evidence, and two of M8's five harness defects were masking real ones. No dependency was added, removed or upgraded. No acceptance test was retired, relaxed or reclassified. M11 is implemented and verified; it is not accepted, and there is no release tag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Qyn3oRd4D6pi72nKBG725B
106 lines
4.0 KiB
Python
106 lines
4.0 KiB
Python
"""Guards on outbound TLS verification.
|
|
|
|
A trusted-LAN Ollama is often served over HTTPS with a certificate from a CA
|
|
the user installed on their own machines rather than one the public web knows.
|
|
`httpx` verifies against `certifi` alone, so such an endpoint failed here while
|
|
`curl` and the browser accepted it. `app/tlstrust.py` unions the machine's CA
|
|
store with certifi's; these tests keep that union honest in both directions —
|
|
it must not lose a public CA, and it must not stop verifying.
|
|
|
|
Everything here is local. Nothing in this file opens a socket, so the suite
|
|
still runs with no network.
|
|
|
|
python -m pytest tests/test_tls_trust.py -v
|
|
"""
|
|
import ast
|
|
import ssl
|
|
from pathlib import Path
|
|
|
|
import certifi
|
|
import pytest
|
|
|
|
from app import tlstrust
|
|
|
|
APP = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "app"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_verification_is_not_weakened():
|
|
"""The point of the change is *where* trust comes from, never whether it is
|
|
checked. A context that skipped verification would make every one of these
|
|
endpoints reachable, including a hostile one."""
|
|
context = tlstrust.ssl_context()
|
|
assert context.verify_mode is ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
|
|
assert context.check_hostname is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_context_is_built_once():
|
|
assert tlstrust.ssl_context() is tlstrust.ssl_context()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_public_certificate_authorities_are_still_trusted():
|
|
"""The union is a strict superset of what httpx trusted before. Swapping
|
|
certifi for the platform store instead would quietly break public
|
|
endpoints on an image whose system store is empty or stale."""
|
|
ours = {c for c in tlstrust.ssl_context().get_ca_certs(binary_form=True)}
|
|
|
|
certifi_only = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=certifi.where())
|
|
theirs = {c for c in certifi_only.get_ca_certs(binary_form=True)}
|
|
|
|
assert theirs, "certifi's bundle came back empty; the comparison proves nothing"
|
|
assert theirs <= ours, f"{len(theirs - ours)} certifi roots are missing from the union"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _async_client_calls(path: Path):
|
|
"""Every `httpx.AsyncClient(...)` construction in a module, as AST nodes."""
|
|
tree = ast.parse(path.read_text())
|
|
for node in ast.walk(tree):
|
|
if not isinstance(node, ast.Call):
|
|
continue
|
|
func = node.func
|
|
if (
|
|
isinstance(func, ast.Attribute)
|
|
and func.attr == "AsyncClient"
|
|
and isinstance(func.value, ast.Name)
|
|
and func.value.id == "httpx"
|
|
):
|
|
yield node
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"module",
|
|
[
|
|
"providers/openai_compatible.py",
|
|
"routers/settings.py",
|
|
# M11: the context-window probe. Registered here rather than exempted —
|
|
# this list existing is what made the new client visible at all, and the
|
|
# point of adding a module to it is that its `verify=` is then asserted
|
|
# on every run like the other two.
|
|
"contextwindow.py",
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_every_http_client_uses_the_shared_context(module):
|
|
"""Checked in the source rather than at runtime, because the failure this
|
|
catches is a *new* client added later without the context — which no
|
|
existing test would exercise, and which would work perfectly until someone
|
|
pointed it at a LAN endpoint."""
|
|
calls = list(_async_client_calls(APP / module))
|
|
assert calls, f"no httpx.AsyncClient found in {module} — has it been renamed?"
|
|
for call in calls:
|
|
keywords = {kw.arg for kw in call.keywords}
|
|
assert "verify" in keywords, (
|
|
f"{module}:{call.lineno} builds an httpx.AsyncClient without "
|
|
f"verify=tlstrust.ssl_context()"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_no_other_module_builds_its_own_client():
|
|
"""If a third module starts making outbound requests, it has to be added to
|
|
the list above rather than inheriting certifi-only trust by default."""
|
|
known = {
|
|
APP / "providers/openai_compatible.py",
|
|
APP / "routers/settings.py",
|
|
APP / "contextwindow.py",
|
|
}
|
|
found = {p for p in APP.rglob("*.py") if any(_async_client_calls(p))}
|
|
assert found == known, f"unexpected httpx.AsyncClient call sites: {found - known}"
|