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interactive-story/DEVELOPMENT.md
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JesseMarkowitzandClaude Opus 5 62a997f364 M4: close out Save Points, with browser verification
Closes M4. The review's three findings are fixed, the durability rule the
specification always implied is now enforced, and M3's and M4's browser
behaviour has been verified in a real browser for the first time.

B-1 -- the Save Point list was an N+1 that loaded whole Action rows,
narration included, to answer "does a row exist here". It is now one bulk
two-column coordinate query plus one lineage: 53 SELECTs for 25 Save Points
became 5, and the count no longer grows with the list. The clause is an OR
of exact (branch, depth) pairs rather than two IN lists, because the cross
product would report a Save Point resolved on the strength of another one's
depth existing on this one's branch. A test builds exactly that trap.

B-2 -- reclassified during closeout from "missing warning" to a behaviour
defect, and fixed as one. STORY-BRANCH-SEMANTICS §19 says a named checkpoint
remains until explicitly deleted, and §28 already required future cleanup to
retain checkpoint-referenced paths; a cascade that silently removed Save
Points with a branch violated both, and a warning would only have documented
the violation. A branch a Save Point names can no longer be deleted. The
request is refused with the offending Save Points named, the user deletes
them explicitly -- which deletes no story -- and the branch then goes. The
scope is the subtree, because deleting a branch takes its descendants. Both
delete controls disable and explain. Recorded as a new §19.1; models.py,
TECHNICAL-DESIGN §8.8 and DATA-MODEL §8 had all recorded the cascade as the
rule and now record the refusal.

An earlier pass in this same closeout had kept the cascade and added a
warning. That was the wrong fix and its tests were replaced rather than left
standing, since they pinned the defect.

B-3 -- the D11/L03 automation never left one process, so it could not
distinguish durable state from a live Python object. It now spawns real
server processes, kills the first, and reads the campaign back with the
second.

C-5 -- creating a Save Point takes the campaign's turn lock. "Save where I
am" has to name one committed position, and the head is what a turn in
flight is about to move. Rename and Delete deliberately do not take it.

The architecture is untouched: a Save Point is still name + note +
(branch, depth), and restore is still coordinate -> head.move_to_node ->
head.move_to -> attempts.restore_state. No second restore path, no state
copied into a checkpoint, no fork on restore.

Browser verification -- the first in this project, and it covers both
milestones. Firefox 154.0.1 through geckodriver over the W3C WebDriver
protocol, driving the rendered DOM: 47/47 checks, twice, on independent
databases, no console errors. M3's Undo/Redo enable states, transcript
movement, Retry and the take pager, divergence retiring Redo; M4's whole
Save Point lifecycle, both confirmations, and the new branch-delete refusal
including its recovery. No dependency was added: the WebDriver client is
stdlib HTTP.

No application defect was found by the browser. Four failures occurred, all
in the harness -- a wrong SPA route, a wait comparing transcript length when
the empty-story placeholder is longer than the first turn, a fixture
deleting the branch it was reading, and a reload assertion that sampled
once instead of waiting. The last was checked against the app before being
called a harness bug.

Tests: 698 backend pass (was 680), 60 M4, 94 M3 history, 66 export/
migrations, 93 security/local-only. Frontend lint and build clean, Docker
build clean, loopback binding unchanged. No assertion weakened, no skip
added.

Planning: STORY-BRANCH-SEMANTICS §19.1 is the only behavioural change and it
strengthens §19. V1-ACCEPTANCE-TESTS records D11-D14, I04, L03 and the
E-series, keeping automated, live-runtime and browser evidence distinct, and
weakens no pass condition. DATA-MODEL records the coordinate with the retry
measurement that settles it. BROWSER-UX-SPEC rules for Moment over Turn.
BUILD-MILESTONES marks M4 COMPLETE, closes M3's browser condition, and lists
what M5 inherits. VERSION adds v2.6.

No new ADR: ADR 005 already decides that history is preserved rather than
overwritten, and §19.1 is that decision applied to checkpoint-referenced
history.

M4 is closed. M5 may now be briefed; it has not been started.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PWU4gTfLYY6Qq9U7aa9Qw2
2026-09-04 06:34:56 -04:00

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Markdown

# Development and local operation
This is the Adventure Storyteller production fork of AI-DnD. `PROVENANCE.md`
records where the code came from; `planning/` holds the product specification
and milestone plan.
Everything here assumes the local-only rule from
`planning/DECISIONS/004-local-only-production.md`: after setup, ordinary story
play must work with **no Internet access at all**. Setup itself downloads
dependencies and models; playing does not.
## Versions this was built and tested on
| | |
| --- | --- |
| OS | Linux (Ubuntu 24.04 userland), x86-64, 4 cores, 15 GB RAM, no GPU |
| Python | 3.12.3 |
| Node | 22.23.1, npm 10.9.8 (the Dockerfile builds the SPA on Node 24) |
| Ollama | `ollama/ollama:latest` in Docker |
| Models | `qwen2.5:3b-instruct` (narrator), `nomic-embed-text` (memory bank) |
## Setup
```bash
# Backend, from the exact tested dependency closure.
python3 -m venv backend/.venv
backend/.venv/bin/pip install -r backend/requirements.lock
# Frontend.
cd frontend && npm ci && cd ..
```
`backend/requirements.lock` pins every version, transitive ones included.
`backend/requirements.txt` states the ranges the code actually needs and stays
the file you edit; regenerate the lock after a deliberate upgrade (the header in
the lock says how).
This is the only step that needs the Internet. It downloads Python and npm
packages; it does **not** download a tokenizer or a font, because both are
vendored in the tree — see "What was made offline-safe" below.
You also need the models, once:
```bash
ollama pull qwen2.5:3b-instruct
ollama pull nomic-embed-text # only if you want the memory bank
```
There is no account to create and nothing to log in to. The application is
single-user: whoever can reach it on loopback is its owner.
## Running
**Development** — backend on `:8000`, Vite dev server on `:5173`:
```bash
./start.sh
```
**Production-shaped** — one server, SPA served by FastAPI:
```bash
cd frontend && npm run build && cd ..
cd backend && .venv/bin/uvicorn app.main:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
```
Then open <http://127.0.0.1:8000>.
**Docker**:
```bash
docker compose up --build
```
### The listener is loopback, and stays loopback
`start.sh`, `start.ps1` and the production command above all pass
`--host 127.0.0.1` explicitly. `docker-compose.yml` publishes
`127.0.0.1:8000:8000` — the process inside the container listens on `0.0.0.0`
because a published port cannot reach anything else, but the port is only
bound on the host's loopback.
That is a requirement, not a preference. In local mode the storyteller API is
single-user and unauthenticated: anything that can reach it can read and
rewrite every campaign. Putting Ollama on another machine (below) does **not**
change this — it is an outbound connection and needs no inbound exposure.
If you publish the port to `0.0.0.0` anyway, you have made a deliberate
decision that this project's threat model does not cover
(`planning/SECURITY-THREAT-MODEL.md`).
## Pointing the storyteller at Ollama
The endpoint, the model and the generation parameters are **runtime settings
stored in the database**, not environment variables. There is no API key field:
M2 removed it along with the cloud providers, and Ollama does not use one. Set
them on the app's Settings page, or with one request:
```bash
curl -X PUT http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/settings \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"endpoint_url":"http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1","model":"qwen2.5:3b-instruct",
"api_mode":"chat","max_output_tokens":200,
"context_token_budget":4096}'
```
`POST /api/settings/test` (the **Test connection** button) returns
`{"ok": true, "models": [...]}` and is the fastest way to tell a wrong endpoint
from a missing model. When it fails it says which kind of failure it was, and
they need different things done about them:
| `kind` | What it means |
| --- | --- |
| `rejected` | The endpoint is outside the policy below. Not a network problem. |
| `unreachable` | Nothing answered. Ollama is not running there, or the port is wrong. |
| `tls` | The certificate did not verify — install the CA (see below). |
| `timeout` | It accepted the connection and then said nothing. |
| `http` | It answered with an error status; the body is included. |
A successful test also warns when the endpoint is reachable but has no model by
the configured name, which is the commonest way for a correct endpoint to still
fail every turn.
### Which endpoints are allowed
`backend/app/endpoints.py` decides, and it is deliberately narrow: **loopback,
your own LAN, or nothing.** The allowed networks are `127.0.0.0/8`, the three
RFC1918 ranges, link-local, IPv6 loopback and unique-local, and `100.64.0.0/10`
(carrier-grade NAT, which is what a mesh VPN such as Tailscale hands out).
Every address the endpoint's hostname resolves to must be in one of them. A
public address is refused, a name resolving to both a private and a public
address is refused, and known cloud inference hosts are refused by name so the
error says why rather than looking like a DNS fault.
The rule is applied when you save the endpoint *and* again before every
outbound request, so a database edited by hand or a hostname that starts
resolving somewhere new cannot turn a local install into an exfiltration path.
There is no setting to relax it.
### Same host (the default)
```text
endpoint_url = http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1
```
Nothing else to do. Ollama's own default is to listen on loopback.
### An Ollama on another machine on your trusted LAN
Supported and explicitly configured — never guessed, never discovered.
On the **inference machine**, tell Ollama to accept connections from the LAN,
because it binds loopback by default:
```bash
OLLAMA_HOST=0.0.0.0:11434 ollama serve
```
On the **storyteller machine**, set the endpoint to that host's address:
```text
endpoint_url = http://192.168.1.50:11434/v1
```
Use an IP address or a name your own network resolves. Then:
- the storyteller UI/API stays on `127.0.0.1` — do not change the listener;
- prompts, story text, retrieved memories and embedding inputs all travel to
that host, so it has to be one you control, on a network you trust;
- the inference machine needs the models installed, not the storyteller;
- no Internet is involved in either direction.
A LAN endpoint is accepted because it is on one of the allowed networks above.
Nothing else about it is special.
#### If that endpoint is HTTPS with your own CA
Some inference hosts are only reachable over TLS. A StartOS server is one: it
serves Ollama over HTTPS with a certificate from its own local CA, and plain
HTTP redirects to it.
Install that CA on the machine running the storyteller, the same way you would
for the browser — on Debian and Ubuntu:
```bash
sudo cp your-ca.crt /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/
sudo update-ca-certificates
```
then use the `https://` URL and the hostname the certificate is issued for:
```text
endpoint_url = https://inference.lan:8443/v1
```
The application verifies against the machine's CA store **and** the `certifi`
bundle (`backend/app/tlstrust.py`), so a CA you installed at the OS level is
honoured, exactly as `curl` and your browser honour it. Public certificates
keep working unchanged.
There is deliberately **no** setting to skip verification. If a connection is
refused with `CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED`, the CA is not installed where the
storyteller can see it, or the URL's hostname does not match the certificate —
`openssl s_client -connect host:port` will say which. In a container, remember
the CA has to be inside the image or bind-mounted; the host's store is not
visible from within.
## Tests
```bash
cd backend && .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q # 698 tests
cd frontend && npm run lint && npm run build
```
Two files are the M1 regression guards.
`test_offline_assets.py` fails if the tokenizer starts fetching its table
again, if a remote font or stylesheet comes back, or if the CSP names a remote
origin. Two of its checks read the built SPA under `frontend/dist/` and skip
when it has not been built, so run `npm run build` before treating a green
suite as complete evidence.
`test_tls_trust.py` fails if outbound verification is weakened, if a public CA
is lost from the union, or if a new HTTP client is added without the shared
verification context.
M4 added `test_save_points.py`, which fails if restoring a Save Point starts
deleting history, stops going through the active head, forks on its own, lets a
Save Point on one campaign be restored through another, or lets deleting a branch
take a Save Point with it. It also fails if listing Save Points goes back to one
query per Save Point, or starts fetching narration to render the list.
`test_process_restart.py` is the durability guard: it starts the application as a
real subprocess, kills it, and starts a second one against the same database. A
Save Point that survived only because a Python object was still alive would pass
an in-process test and fail a user's restart.
M2 added two more. `test_endpoint_policy.py` fails if the set of reachable
addresses widens, or if either place the rule is applied stops applying it —
it resolves hostnames through a stub, so it tests the policy rather than
whatever DNS the machine has. `test_local_only_surface.py` fails if a removed
subsystem comes back as a route, if an API key becomes settable again, if the
model timeout stops being configurable or becomes unbounded, or if a supported
start path stops binding loopback.
## What was made offline-safe, and how to check
Two runtime downloads were removed in Milestone M1. Both were invisible on a
machine that had been online once, which is exactly why they need tests.
**The tokenizer.** `tiktoken.get_encoding("cl100k_base")` downloads a 1.7 MB
BPE table on first use, and the context builder counts tokens on every turn, so
the first story turn on an air-gapped install died with a `ConnectionError`.
The table is vendored at `backend/app/context/vendor/cl100k_base.tiktoken` and
`backend/app/context/encoding.py` builds the encoding from it, verifying its
SHA-256 against the digest `tiktoken` itself pins.
**The fonts.** The SPA linked `fonts.googleapis.com` from `index.html`, so
every page load fetched a stylesheet and font files from Google. The three
families are self-hosted under `frontend/public/fonts/`, declared in
`frontend/src/styles/fonts.css`, and re-vendored by
`python3 frontend/tools/vendor_fonts.py`. The CSP in `backend/app/main.py` now
names no remote origin at all.
To convince yourself on a machine that has already been online, run the app
with no route out rather than trusting a cold cache:
```bash
docker network create --internal offline
docker run -d --name ollama --network offline -v ollama-models:/root/.ollama ollama/ollama
docker build -t storyteller .
# The app shares Ollama's network namespace, so Ollama is on its loopback and
# neither has a route to the Internet.
docker run -d --name app --network container:ollama -v story-data:/data \
storyteller uvicorn app.main:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
docker exec app python -c "import socket; socket.create_connection(('1.1.1.1',443),timeout=4)"
# -> OSError: Network is unreachable, and story turns still work
```
`planning/archive/milestone-reports/M1-BASELINE-REPORT.md` records the run this procedure is
taken from, including the packet captures.
## Things still inherited from upstream
M2 removed the hosted, cloud, account, analytics, Postgres/Render and QuickJS
scripting surfaces outright — `PROVENANCE.md` lists exactly what went. What is
left of upstream that a newcomer might report as a defect:
- **Inert legacy tables and columns.** Five tables and four columns M2 emptied
of meaning are still in the schema, unmapped, so an M1-era campaign database
opens unchanged. Nothing reads or writes them. A cleanup migration waits for
the schema to settle after M5 (`planning/BUILD-MILESTONES.md`).
- **Dual-dialect migration code.** `backend/app/migrations.py` still carries
SQLite/Postgres branches from upstream, although Postgres support itself is
gone and SQLite is the only store. Same cleanup, same milestone.
- **`.github/workflows/ci.yml`** is upstream's GitHub Actions pipeline. This
repository lives on a self-hosted Gitea; the workflow is kept for provenance
and is not what runs the tests here.
- **No frontend tests.** `npm run lint && npm run build` is the whole frontend
check. A test runner is M8's job.